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Abstract
Although widely adopted, one of the biggest concerns with cloud computing is
how to preserve the security and privacy of client data being processed and/or stored
in a cloud computing environment. When it comes to cloud data protection, the
methods employed can be very similar to protecting data within a traditional data
center. Authentication and identity, access control, encryption, secure deletion, in-
tegrity checking, and data masking are all data protection methods that have appli-
cability in cloud computing. Current research in cloud data protection primarily falls
into three main categories: 1) Authentication & Access Control, 2) Encryption, and
3) Intrusion Detection. This thesis examines the various mechanisms that currently
exist to protect data being stored in a public cloud computing environment. It also
looks at the methods employed to detect intrusions targeting cloud data when and
if data protection mechanisms fail. In response to these findings, we present three
primary contributions that focus on enhancing the overall security of user data resid-
ing in a hosted environment such as the cloud. We first provide an analysis of Cloud
Storage vendors that shows how data can be exposed when shared - even in the most
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‘secure’ environments. Secondly, we offer Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) as a method of
securing data within this environment while enhancing PGP’s Web of Trust validation
mechanism using Bitcoin. Lastly, we provide a framework for protecting data exfil-
tration attempts in Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) Cloud Storage environments using
Cyber Deception.
Primary Reader: Giuseppe Ateniese
Secondary Reader: William Agresti
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Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand net-
work access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks,
servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and re-
leased with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. This cloud
model is composed of five essential characteristics: on-demand self-service, broad
network access, resource pooling, rapid elasticity and measured service, three service
models: Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastruc-
ture as a Service (IaaS), and four deployment models: Private Cloud, Community
Cloud, Public Cloud and Hybrid Cloud.1
In SaaS, Cloud application services deliver software as a service over the Internet,
eliminating the need to install and run the application on the customer’s own com-
puters and simplifying maintenance and support. In PaaS, Cloud platform services
1
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Figure 1.1: NIST Cloud Computing Model
deliver a computing platform and/or solution stack as a service, often consuming
cloud infrastructure and sustaining cloud applications. Lastly, in IaaS, Cloud infras-
tructure services, deliver computer infrastructure - typically a platform virtualization
environment as a service, along with block storage and networking.
In a Private cloud, the cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use by a
single organization comprising multiple consumers. It may be owned, managed, and
operated by the organization, a third party, or some combination of them, and it may
exist on or off premises. A Community cloud is provisioned for exclusive use by a
specific community of consumers from organizations that have shared concerns (e.g.,
mission, security requirements, policy, and compliance considerations). It may be
owned, managed, and operated by one or more of the organizations in the community,
2
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a third party, or some combination of them, and it may exist on or off premises.
A Public Cloud infrastructure is provisioned for open use by the general public.
It may be owned, managed, and operated by a business, academic, or government
organization, or some combination of them. It exists on the premises of the cloud
provider. Lastly, in a Hybrid cloud, the cloud infrastructure is a composition of two
or more distinct cloud infrastructures (private, community, or public) that remain
unique entities, but are bound together by standardized or proprietary technology
that enables data and application portability (e.g., cloud bursting for load balancing
between clouds).1
1.1 Background
Although widely adopted, one of the biggest concerns with cloud computing is
how to preserve the security and privacy of client data being processed and/or
stored in a cloud computing environment. These concerns primarily exist because
the traditional system boundaries are not present in the cloud and multiple tenants
will commonly share the cloud infrastructure as is the case in a Public Cloud offering.
Multi-tenancy refers to a principle in software architecture where a single instance of
the application runs on a server, serving multiple tenants. This is in contrast to a
multi-instance architecture where separate software instances (or hardware systems)
are set up for different client organizations. This issue is further complicated when
3
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more than one cloud service provider is involved in a user/provider interaction.
There are a number of methods that have been proposed to handle the concerns of
security and privacy in cloud computing, one of which is cloud data protection. When
it comes to cloud data protection, methods can be similar to protecting data within
a traditional data center. Authentication and identity, access control, encryption,
secure deletion, integrity checking, and data masking are all data protection methods
that have applicability in cloud computing. Authentication of users takes several
forms, but all are based on a combination of authentication factors : something an
individual knows (such as a password), something they possess (such as a security
token), or some measurable quality that is intrinsic to them (such as a fingerprint).
When we discuss Access Controls, we refer to: 1) Subjects which are people or
processes acting on their behalf or 2) Objects such as files or other resources (a
directory, device, or service of some sort). Access controls are generally described as
either discretionary or non-discretionary, and the most common access control models
are: Discretionary Access Control, Role-based Access Control, and Mandatory Access
Control. Encryption is a key component to protect data at rest in the cloud. There
are multiple ways of encrypting data at rest in the cloud. These include: full disk,
directory level (or file system), file level, or application level. As usual, critical to
implementing any of these forms of encryption is the need to manage the keys that
are used to encrypt and decrypt data. Integrity Checking is typically performed
via a hash function or similar construct (e.g. Cyclic Redundancy Check or CRC)
4
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that is computed at the time a file is created in the cloud and subsequently saved.
The check is performed by recomputing the hash function output or CRC prior to
editing the file to verify that the original value matches. Clearing and Sanitization are
methods most commonly employed when Deleting cloud data. The DoD 5220.22-M,
National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual describes these methods in
more detail. It is important to note that data stored in a public cloud is not often
sanitized to DoD levels. Lastly, Data Masking is a technique that is intended to
remove all identifiable and distinguishing characteristics from data in order to render
it anonymous and yet still be operable.2
In the event that the aforementioned cloud data protection mechanisms fail or are
compromised, it is important to be able to accurately detect the issue. Although dis-
tributed Intrusion Detection System (IDS) technology has been tested to be capable
of working well in some large scale networks, the utilization and deployment in Cloud
Computing is still a challenging task. The complex architecture of a Cloud infrastruc-
ture and the different kinds of users lead to different requirements and possibilities for
being secured by IDS. An important issue for the user is not having full control over
the used infrastructure. Although some of the Cloud users require to separate the
IDS and the monitored target, it is still necessary for the Cloud provider to provide
such a possibility that certain end users can fully control at least the currently used
resources.3 To counter a number of these aforementioned challenges, in chapters 3,
4, and 5 we look at ways to securely share data in the cloud, offer better security
5
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guarantees to users in terms of data protection, and to mitigate data theft in a cloud
storage environment. In the next chapter, we expound upon the prior work that seeks




As mentioned in chapter 1, three of the ways in which data can be protected in the
cloud are: Strong Access Control and Authentication, Data Encryption, and Intrusion
Detection. In this chapter, we expound upon these areas and detail prior work that
focuses on the danger of relying upon these methods alone for data protection. This
sets a precedent for our research contributions to follow. In chapters 3, 4, and 5
we present related work specific to our contributions: Data Sharing in the Cloud,
Enhanced PGP using Bitcoin, and the Mitigation of Data Exfiltration in SaaS cloud
environments.
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2.1 Overview
Maintaining confidentiality, integrity, and availability for data security is a func-
tion of the correct application and configuration of familiar network, system, and
application security mechanisms at various levels in the cloud infrastructure. Among
these mechanisms are a broad range of components that implement authentication
and access control. Authentication of users and even of communication systems is
performed by various means. Single factor authentication is based on only one au-
thentication factor. Stronger authentication requires additional factors; for instance,
two factor authentication is based on two authentication factors (such as a pin and
a fingerprint). Authentication is usually predicated on an underlying identity infras-
tructure. The most basic scheme is where account information for one or a small
number of users is kept in flat files that are used to verify identity and passwords,
but this scheme does not scale to more than a very few systems.
The key to effective access controls is the centralization of identity. One problem
with using traditional identity approaches in a cloud environment is faced when the
enterprise uses multiple Cloud Service Providers. In such a use case, synchronizing
identity information with the enterprise is not scalable. These and other issues arise
when migrating infrastructure toward a cloud-based solution. Infrastructure tends
to employ domain-centric identity approaches that do not allow for looser alignment
such as with partnership. For these reasons, federated identity management (FIM) is
an effective foundation for identity in cloud computing.
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Authentication and access control serve as the first layer of the Defense in Depth
posture within a Cloud Storage Environment. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
have been used widely to detect malicious behaviors in network communication and
hosts in the event of an authentication or access control failure. IDS management is
an important capability for distributed IDS solutions, which makes it possible to in-
tegrate and handle different types of sensors or collect and synthesize alerts generated
from multiple hosts located in the distributed environment. Facing new application
scenarios in Cloud Computing, the IDS approaches yield several problems since the
operator of the IDS should be the user, not the administrator of the Cloud infrastruc-
ture. Extensibility, efficient management, and compatibility to virtualization-based
context need to be introduced into many existing IDS implementations. Additionally,
the Cloud providers need to enable possibilities to deploy and configure IDS for the
user.
To overcome the threat of data compromise in the cloud, encryption is often
heralded as be all end all solution. According to the Enterprise Cloud Computing
Blog4 three of the common security questions that should be asked when considering
a cloud service provider for data storage are:
1. Data on Wire. Are files transferred to/from cloud servers encrypted?
2. Data at Rest. Are files stored on cloud servers encrypted?
3. Data Retention. If files on cloud servers are encrypted and there is a re-
9
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quest from law enforcement to decrypt the data, then what do you do? Bonus
question: What if you have the key(s)?
There are multiple ways of encrypting data at rest in the cloud. Full disk en-
cryption is encryption of data at the disk level. With this method of encryption,
the operating system, its applications, and the data residing on it are all encrypted
simply by existing on the encrypted disk. The major concerns with this approach are
that of performance and reliability. For example, even minor disk corruption can be
fatal as the OS, applications, and data rely on the encryption infrastructure at this
level. With file system encryption, entire data directories are encrypted or decrypted
as a container. Access to files requires use of encryption/decryption keys. This ap-
proach can also be used to segregate data of identical sensitivity or categorization into
directories that are individually encrypted with different keys. File level encryption
is simply the use of encryption at the file level vs. the file system or disk. This is
commonly the most efficient form of encryption. At the application level, encryption
and decryption of data is managed by the applications themselves. In addition to
the common key management challenges associated with encryption, identifying data
recovery methods in the event that an encryption key is lost or inaccessible is critical.
10
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2.2 Encryption in the Cloud
Even with its shortfalls, our research indicates that encryption is still the preferred
method of protecting data in the public cloud. In lieu of this, this section primarily
focuses on prior work that attempts to use encryption for various means of data
protection in the cloud.
2.2.1 Searchable Encryption in the Cloud
In a typical searchable encryption scheme, only a single-user (i.e. only the holder
of a secret key, which is referred to as query key) can issue valid search queries
upon the cloud database. Yangs work considers the fact that there are cases in
which searchable encryption needs to work in a multi-user setting (e.g. an enterprise
outsources its database to the cloud, and authorizes multiple users).5 He proposes
an efficient multi-user searchable encryption scheme, which possesses the following
beneficial features.
• Distinct Query Keys. Each authorized user has a distinct query key for
constructing search queries. This makes user revocation and accountability
possible.
• Complete User Revocation. Allows for very efficient user revocation: revo-
cation of a user does not affect other non-revoked users at all, requiring neither
key renewal for non-revoked users, nor update to the encrypted database includ-
11
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ing the index. Moreover, revoked users completely lose their search privileges,
given that the semi-trusted cloud destroyed the related helper keys which aid
in processing queries.
• Exculpability. Scheme achieves exculpability which ensures that no one (in-
cluding the cloud) can generate valid search queries on behalf of a user. Excul-
pability turns out to be an important property in the multi-user setting where
accountability is desired.
In their work, Wang et. al. consider the large number of data users and huge
amount of outsourced data files in the cloud. This problem is particularly challenging
as it is extremely difficult to meet also the practical requirements of performance,
system usability, and high-level user searching experiences. Their work investigates
these challenges and defines the problem of fuzzy keyword search over encrypted
cloud data, which should be explored for effective data utilization in Cloud Comput-
ing. Fuzzy keyword search aims at accommodating various typos and representation
inconsistencies in different user searching input for acceptable system usability and
overall user searching experience, while protecting keyword privacy. The overall ser-
vice design will provide built-in security assurances of keyword privacy and data file
confidentiality at an acceptable cost and benefit cloud customers who seek to utilize
the cloud with strong privacy guarantee. In addition, it is also expected to enable
cloud service providers to securely and effectively deliver value from the cloud infras-
tructure to their enterprise customers, significantly encouraging the adoption of the
12
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cloud.6
Prior works on query processing on encrypted data did not provide data confiden-
tiality guarantees when data is stored and accessed in the cloud. Tradeoffs between
secrecy and efficiency needs to be made when satisfying both aspects of data confiden-
tiality while being suitable for practical use. Second, to support common relational
data management functions, various types of queries such as exact queries, range
queries, data updates, insertion and deletion should be supported. In their work,
Wang e.t. al. proposes a comprehensive framework for secure and efficient query pro-
cessing of relational data in the cloud. Their framework ensures data confidentiality
using a salted Information Dispersal Algorithm encoding scheme and column-access-
via-proxy query processing primitives, and ensures query efficiency using matrix col-
umn accesses and a secure B+-tree index. In addition, they also make claims of data
availability and integrity.7
Koletka and Hutchison discuss a solution to cloud security and privacy that allows
users to securely store data on a public cloud, while also allowing for searchability
through the users encrypted data. Users are able to submit encrypted keyword queries
and, through a symmetric searchable encryption scheme, the system finds all files with
such keywords contained within. The system is designed in such a manner that trust
from a public cloud provider is not required. The solution satisfies data confidentiality
and integrity, file sharing is catered for, and a user key-revocation scheme is in place.
Encryption provides security in the event of a data breach.8
13
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Current encrypted search schemes that allow multiple users to read and write
to the database have two major drawbacks: (i) they support only keyword searches
or conjunctions of keywords, and (ii) do not allow the specifying of different access
policies for different users. Instead, they assume all users have the same rights.
Ion e.t. al. show an implementation of a novel scheme that addresses both issues.
The presented scheme allows multi-users to perform complex, SQLlike queries on
the encrypted database without revealing the query to the cloud server, and allows
enforcing different access control policies for the users, in a single, integrated solution.
Lastly, the scheme does not leak to the cloud provider information on the access
policies.9
2.2.2 Secure Information Sharing for Cloud
In10 Li et. al. propose a mechanism in which the cloud platform is utilized to
accomplish electronic medical record exchange, and at the same time used to protect
the patients privacy. The electronic medical record numbers, generated using the SID
in the health data card, random value, and treatment serial number, are all different
even for the same patient for each of his or her electronic medical record numbers. It
has the unlinkability characteristic. In addition, a one time key is used for medical
record encryption to enhance the security of the encrypted section. The utilization
of the cloud platform not only allows hospitals with fewer resources to receive the
electronic medical record service and save electronic medical records, but also allows
14
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patients to review their own medical records at home. In the future, cloud technology
may be used to review medical records on mobile devices, instead of the service being
limited to a sole terminal device such as a computer.
One way to handle the issues of security and privacy as it relates to cloud data
storage is to support data replication and distribution on the cloud via a local, cen-
trally synchronized storage. In11 Pagano proposes the use of an in-memory RDBMS
with row-level data encryption for granting and revoking access rights to distributed
data. It can be used in the cloud to manage very granular access rights in a highly
distributed database. This allows for stronger confidence in the privacy of shared
sensitive data. An interesting field of application is the use in (business) cooperative
environments (e.g. professional networks). In these environments, privacy is a prior-
ity, but low computing resources don’t allow the use of slow and complex algorithms.
IMDBs and their smart encryption technique achieve the goal in a more effective way.
In12 Aniello, et. al. describe the architecture of a basic secure file sharing facility
relying on a multi-party threshold-based key-sharing scheme that can be overlaid on
top of the existing stackable networked file systems. They discuss its application
to the implementation of distributed cryptographic file systems. They focus on the
following 3 properties concerning a shared file on a group of n users with a (secret
sharing) threshold k n: 1) the file creator only needs to know the public keys of all
the group members, 2) whoever wants to access (read/write) the shared file, must be
a group member and must contact at least k 1 group members, 3) no user outside
15
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the group can gain access to a shared file even if he receives help from all members
of the group.
Sohn et. al.13 propose a method for sharing User Generate Content (UGC) se-
curely based on the personal information of users. With the proposed method, virtual
secure space is created for content delivery. The virtual secure space allows UGC cre-
ator to deliver contents to users who have similar personal information and they can
consume the contents without any leakage of personal information. This scheme re-
stricts information access to specific groups of individuals with similar interests and
profiles by creating encrypted vaults accessible by users with similarities (e.g. age,
hobbies, occupation, etc). The advantage of this approach is that creators would not
have to be concerned about potential misuse of their content by being assured that
their content are delivered to users with similar preferences. This will also aid in
organizing content.
The same group of authors14 present the design of a secure cache system that
allows roaming users to cache files on untrusted file hosting servers - like the cloud.
The system allows flexible sharing of cached files among unauthenticated users and
does not require a global authentication framework. Files are encrypted when they are
transferred over network and stored and system uses Public Key cryptography which
enables secure information sharing in the untrusted environment. Sharing is discussed
as follows: when a roaming user wishes to give another user read access to one of
his/her files, the decryption key is provided to that user - along with information
16
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required to access the file on cache server. It is also possible to share encryption keys
with other users - at a user’s discretion.
In15 Yen-Hung et. al. propose and develops a scalable Secure Enterprise File Sync
and Share (EFSS) service which can be deployed on the OpenStack cloud infrastruc-
ture to securely provide employees with EFSS service. Security issues, including
employee privacy protection, management of share links and synchronized cloud files,
and the secure enterprise directory integration, are discussed in this article. Secure
sharing is accomplished in their scheme via Distinct Share Links - which is able to
protect the share link by decreasing its diffusibility and adding traceability and con-
trollability to it. To protect a share link, a distinct share link layer is created between
the share link and clients, and the Distinct Share Links in the additional layer are
pointing to the share link. Moreover, the Distinct Share Links are attached with per-
missions, identities, and access conditions, they are then sent to different recipients
according to their identities. If the recipient passes the identity and access condition
checks, the Distinct Share Link then prepares an ephemeral representation for the
recipient to access the share link.
Secure and trustworthy file sharing over cloud storage using eID tokens16 presents
a multi-platform, open-source application that aims to protect data stored and shared
in existing cloud storage services. The access to the cryptographic material used to
protect data is implemented using the identification and authentication functionali-
ties of national electronic identity (eID) tokens. The solution provides the following
17
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benefits: (i) confidentiality, to prevent non-authorized readings, (ii) integrity control,
to detect malicious tampering, (iii) protection against unwanted file removals, either
by malicious or legitimate persons, and (iv) access control to the shared data based
on strong identification and authentication of people, using the nowadays widespread
electronic, personal identity tokens (eIDs for short). Identification and authentication
of users in Protbox was accomplished using national eID tokens - since they already
contained X.509 authentication certificates and embedded Public Keys to validate
signatures of Pair Key requests and responses. In this way, the access to protected
files shared through the cloud only occurs after a two-factor authentication takes
place.
Lastly, Shu et. al. present Shield17 which is a stackable secure storage system
for file sharing in public storage. Shield is designed to secure data storing and data
sharing inside the trust domain (e.g., an organization or department) under the net-
work and storage environments shared among multiple parties, and to save file owners
from tedious management without fully trusting the cloud server. Design goals and
benefits are: Underlying file systems independence, End-to-end protection for confi-
dentiality and integrity, Keys management and key distribution, Efficient permission
revocation and concurrent writing support. Shield excludes the secret keys manage-
ment from the responsibility of the cloud server to minimize the risk of user data
compromise by the provider themselves or a malicious adversary. The cloud server is
only responsible for storing the files and providing access control for the cipher text
18
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(restricting data access to authorized users). The Proxy Server (PS) in their model
can serve as a file owner defined delegate as long as it is in the same trust domain -
serving as an independent third party. It is primarily responsible for processing users’
access requests by distributing the corresponding secret keys according to their access
permissions.
2.2.3 Secure Cloud Storage
Data confidentiality is one of the key concerns that prevent organizations from
widely adopting third-party computing clouds. Puttaswamy et. al. describe a set
of techniques that promote data confidentiality on the cloud using end-to-end data
encryption. Encrypted data on the cloud prevents privacy leakage to compromised or
malicious clouds, while users can easily access data by decrypting data locally with
keys from a trusted organization. Using dynamic program analysis techniques, they
have been able to automatically identify functionally encryptable application data,
data that can be safely encrypted without negatively affecting application function-
ality. Through the modification of the application runtime engine, they show how an
optimal assignment of encryption keys can be determined that minimizes key manage-
ment overhead and impact of key compromise. The major benefit of their approach is
that applications running on the cloud can protect their data from security breaches
or compromises in the cloud through the adoption of these methods.18
In their work19 Bessani et. al. present a dependable and secure storage system
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that leverages the benefits of cloud computing by using a combination of diverse
commercial clouds to build a cloud-of-clouds. In other words, their implementation
is a virtual storage cloud, which is accessed by its users by invoking operations in
several individual clouds. It addresses four important limitations of cloud computing
for data storage in the following way:
• Loss of availability: approach handles this problem by exploiting replication
and diversity to store the data on several clouds, thus allowing access to the
data as long as a subset of them is reachable.
• Loss and corruption of data: approach handles problem using Byzantine
fault-tolerant replication to store data on several cloud services, allowing data
to be retrieved correctly even if some of the clouds corrupt or lose data.
• Loss of privacy: approach employs a secret sharing scheme and erasure codes
to avoid storing clear data in the clouds and to improve the storage efficiency,
amortizing the replication factor on the cost of the solution.
• Vendor lock-in: approach does not depend on a single cloud provider, but
on a few, so data access can be balanced among the providers considering their
practices (e.g., what they charge). Second, it uses erasure codes to store only a
fraction (typically half) of the total amount of data in each cloud. In case the
need of exchanging one provider by another arises, the cost of migrating the
data will be at most a fraction of what it would be otherwise.
20
CHAPTER 2. PRIOR WORK
In,20 Huang et. al. propose a privacy-preserving cloud storage framework, which
includes the design of data organization structure, the generation and management
of keys, the treatment of users access right changes, dynamic operations of data, and
the interaction between participants. They have designed an interactive protocol and
an extirpation-based key derivation algorithm, which are combined with lazy revo-
cation, multi-tree structure and symmetric encryption to form a privacy-preserving,
efficient framework for cloud storage. Lastly, they present their analysis of the ef-
fectiveness of extirpation-based key derivation, system overhead, and validate their
privacy-preserving claims.
SiRiUS21 can work over insecure file systems as a cryptographic storage layer to
supply storage security. Plutus22 offers cryptographic group sharing with lazy revo-
cation, random access, and file name encryption. CRUST23 is a stackable secure file
system with completely symmetrical encryption and in-band key distribution. How-
ever, Plutus, SiRiUS and CRUST all require the file owner to bear the burden of
dominating the access control and key distribution (although there are some differ-
ences in key distribution: Plutus needs users to get the file key from the file owner,
while SiRiUS and CRUST require pre-sharing of some message of key materials among
users before file access). Moreover, SiRiUS employs aggressive revocation which re-
quires far more intensive computations than lazy revocation and CRUST relies on
some global shared data structures to distribute keys and to retrieve previous states
for revocation. Sharing models such as these allow the users to have control over the
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sharing of their files as well as distributing the keys to access the files of interest.
Companies like Navajo Systems24 and Ciphercloud25 provide a trusted application-
level proxy that intercepts network traffic between clients and cloud-hosted servers
(e.g. IMAP), and encrypts sensitive data stored on the server. These products appear
to breakup sensitive data (specified by application-specific rules) into tokens(such
as words in a string), and encrypt each of these tokens using an order-preserving
encryption scheme, which allows token-level searching and sorting. SUNDR26 uses
cryptography to provide privacy and integrity in a file system on top of an untrusted
file server. Using a SUNDR-like model, SPORC27 and Depot28 show how to build
low-latency applications, running mostly on the clients, without having to trust a
server. However, existing server-side applications that involve separate database and
application servers cannot be used with these systems unless they are rewritten as
distributed client-side applications to work with SPORC or Depot. Many applications
are not amenable to such a structure.
Lastly, the following cloud storage security solutions, implemented as third-party
software applications, possess similar features to the Secure CSPs we analyzed: Box-
Cryptor,29 Viivo,30 CloudFogger,31 Sookasa,32 TrueCrypt33 and CCE (Citizen Card
Encrypted).34 For the majority of these solutions, encryption keys and the sharing
logic of these is handled within a backend platform available in a web server. Users
must implicitly trust that the web server is safeguarded. For example, in BoxCryptor,
file sharing is targeted to individual files, where a random key is generated to encrypt
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every different file that can be shared with another single user or with a group of
users. This key is then stored in the BoxCryptor Key Server and made accessible
to the intended user or group. As security measures, these keys are encrypted with
cryptographic material generated from the users credentials and stored locally. The
remaining solutions allow the sharing of whole directories with specific users, generat-
ing an encryption key per directory and storing it in the applications backend servers,
with access limited to those users. The encryption material relevant to file protection
is said to be kept locally, without ever being transferred to these backend servers.
For a more controlled sharing protocol, Viivo proposes a mediator-based imple-
mentation where every shared folder has a user with moderator privileges, which, by
default, is the first user to attain access to said folder. New users must request for
permission of access to the encrypted contents directly to the moderator, and this
moderator must constantly check for and manage these requests. Since there is only
one moderator per folder, this moderator must be familiar with all of the request-
ing users. With this, a user that is only known as trustworthy by a single or a few
users of the shared folder excluding the moderator will, more likely than not, have
his request denied. With Protbox, every single sharing request is sent in a multicast
fashion, and the requirements for one of these requests to be accepted is to provide
a valid certificate chain and a valid signature and to have at least one user accept
such a request. This solution does not have a central authority controlling ownership
rights over Shared Folders; everyone that has access to the Shared Folder is a peer
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with equal rights. These approaches all discuss ways in which secure sharing could
be approached in a hosted environment such as the cloud. As stated above, in most
of the solutions users must implicitly trust that the web server is safeguarded. In
the next chapter we provide the results of our analysis of cloud vendors claiming full
security within their environments. We are able to demonstrate through our analysis
that these claims are only valid if data is not shared among cloud users.
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Dangers of Sharing in Secure
Cloud Environments
With the advent of cloud computing, a number of Cloud Storage Providers (CSPs)
have arisen to provide Storage-as-a-Service (SaaS) offerings to both regular consumers
and business organizations. SaaS refers to an architectural model in which a cloud
provider provides digital storage on their own infrastructure.36 Three models exist
amongst SaaS providers for protecting the confidentiality of data stored in the cloud:
1) no encryption (data is stored in plain text), 2) server-side encryption (data is
encrypted once uploaded), and 3) client-side encryption (data is encrypted prior to
upload). Dropbox is the most popular version of a cloud storage provider that ad-
heres to the first confidentiality model. In this chapter we examine secure alternatives
to Dropbox that provide client-side encryption. Our primary motivation is based on
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consistent claims made by CSPs that guarantee the confidentiality of data stored in
the cloud. The major claims are as follows:
• “No one unauthorized not even the cloud storage provider can access the files.”37
• “Our ’zero-knowledge’ privacy environment ensures we can never see your data.
Not our staff. Not the government. Not anyone.”38
• “Contrary to other solutions, no storage provider or network administrator, no
unauthorized hacker, not even we can read your files.”39
These principles of confidentiality hold true in use cases where data is not shared
with other cloud users or with entities outside of the cloud storage environment (e.g.,
non-members). In the evaluated SaaS environments, data sharing is accomplished
in three ways: Web Link, Folder, or Group, the latter two being the focus of this
research. Through our analysis we discovered that for each data sharing mechanism,
there are inherent weaknesses that can expose user data to the cloud provider which
directly contradicts the aforementioned CSP claims. What would prompt a Cloud
Provider to compromise the trust of its users in this way?
1. National Security: In the interest of National Security, governments will
often collect citizen data for the purposes of confirming a threat. This collec-
tion typically consists of activities such as wire tapping, data harvesting, and
other forms of information collection. Data Harvesting (usually associated with
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Cloud-Storage attacks) refers to the collection of disparate data from a homo-
geneuous location. This approach is advantageous for a Government seeking
data points from multiple entities such as is the case in a co-resident Cloud
Storage environment.
2. Oppressive Government: Under certain government regimes, there may exist
situations in which a Government might “force” a Cloud Provider to comply
with new or existing disclosure regulations. Reasons for this may include: 1)
Company Sanctions, 2) Periodic Evaluations, or 3) to Limit Monopoly business
practices.
3. Data Leakage Confirmation As is common in the “Networked” world, data
that is accessible via the Internet is subject to data breaches. The Data Breach
Notification Laws require states to report the occurrence of company and state-
related data breaches. In order to confirm and subsequently comply with these
laws, Cloud Providers could potentially need to access user data in plain text
form.
We discuss the following contributions in this chapter:
• We present an overview of the various sharing scenarios employed by each eval-
uated CSP
• We highlight the weaknesses found in each CSP sharing scenario. Our research
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focus is on exposing the weaknesses in private Group and Folder sharing sce-
narios.
• We describe how an attack against private Group or Folder sharing functions
could work in practice.
• We provide evidence of Certificate Authority functionality via network traffic
and source code analysis.
• We reverse engineer various CSPs code to reveal evidence that substantiates
our claims that user data is not 100% safe from being read and/or manipulated
by the CSP.
• We provide suggestions for addressing the inherent weaknesses discovered in the
design of the CSP sharing functions.
3.1 Related Work
This section puts our analysis in perspective by examining preceding work that
relates to the analysis of Cloud Storage Providers (CSPs). Prior work falls into three
specific categories: 1) General Analysis of CSP security capabilities, 2) Analysis of the
Design and Implementation of CSPs, and 3) Analysis of the Weaknesses associated
with CSPs.
In,40 Borgmann and Waidner of the Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information
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Technology, they studied the security mechanisms of seven Cloud Storage Services:
CloudMe, CrashPlan, Dropbox, Mozy, TeamDrive, Ubuntu One, and Wuala. The
study focused on the following security requirements: Registration and Login, Trans-
port Security, Encryption, Secure File Sharing, and Secure Deduplication. Similar
to our approach, they examine several aspects of the CSP’s file sharing mechanisms
for security flaws. Specifically, they highlight the fact that if client-side encryption is
used, sharing should not weaken the security level. In particular, the CSP should not
be able to read the shared files. The scope of their work covered sharing with other
subscribers of the same service, sharing files with a closed group of non-subscribers,
and sharing files with everybody. As we also discovered in our research, sharing via
secret web link (e.g., closed group of non-subscribers) or making data public reveals
shared data to the CSP. Their analysis, however, did not yield the fact that sharing
files with subscribers could also result in a breach of confidentiality with the CSP due
to the CSP acting in a Certificate Authority (CA) capacity. This is proven in our
analysis and can serve as a viable extension to their work.
Mager et al. in41 examine the design and implementation of an online backup
and file sharing system called Wuala. The goals of their work consist of four primary
items: Characterization of the Infrastructure, Understanding the Data Placement
Methodology, Identifying the Coding Techniques relating to Data Availability (ac-
cessibility of files at any time) and Durability (ensuring files are never lost), and the
Determination of the Data Transport Protocol used. The scope of their evaluation
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does not necessarily include security considerations, although the data structure em-
ployed by Wuala for sharing data is mentioned as well as the type of encryption used
for performing client-side encryption. Overall, this research provided useful insight
into methods employed by the CSP to facilitate client usage of their infrastructure,
however, it does not examine the infrastructure or design in detail for security weak-
nesses. As it pertains to their goals, our work differs in that it looks at the CSP
infrastructure security features for consistency with user expectations. We focus on
the data sharing (not placement) methodology employed by the CSPs. The coding
techniques we identified relate to the discovery of evidence that the CSP is operating
in a CA capacity during sharing transactions.
Finally in,42 Kholia and Wegrzyn analyze the Dropbox cloud-based file storage
service from a security perspective. Their research presents novel techniques to re-
verse engineer frozen Python applications (to include Dropbox). They specifically
describe a method to bypass Dropbox’s two factor authentication and hijack Drop-
box accounts. Additionally, they introduce generic approaches to intercept SSL data
using code injection techniques and monkey patching. This work is consistent with
our analysis of CSPs for major security flaws as it results in the exposure of private
user data and enables the CSP to have access to shared user data.
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3.2 Cloud Storage Provider Overview
This section provides an overview of the Cloud Storage Providers (CSPs) we eval-
uated and the ‘confidentiality model’ they each employ to protect the confidentiality
of user data. We define a confidentiality model as the method employed by the CSP
to protect the confidentiality of users’ stored data. According to,43,44 there are several
CSPs that offer client-side encryption. For our analysis, we focused on Wuala, Spider
Oak, and Tresorit. Wuala encryption is performed with AES256 prior to files being
uploaded. Encryption comprehensively includes not only file content, but also: file
names, preview images, folders and metadata. An RSA2048 key is used for signatures
and key exchange when folders are shared while SHA-256 is used for data integrity.
Spider Oak can be used to share and back up files. Data is encrypted on a user com-
puter with AES256 in CFB mode and HMAC-SHA256. As mentioned previously, the
company claims to have no knowledge of what data is stored in their servers or user
passwords. Their software works in smart phones, the Linux operating system, and
Windows.43 Lastly, Tresorit is a Hungarian-based company that uses AES256 to en-
crypt data before uploading it to the cloud. The company is offering $10,000.00 (US)
to anyone who can break their security software. Similar to Spider Oak, data can
be accessed via smart phone or desktop computer. Each CSP’s confidentiality model
is discussed in the following subsections. All information in this section has been
adapted from the CSP’s website and/or documentation unless otherwise specified.
Table 1 summarizes the confidentiality model employed by each CSP based on
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Sharing Scenario
Public Private Public Private Public Private
CSP Web Link Web Link Folder Folder Group Group
Wuala Public Private Public Public Key Public Public Key
URL URL Folder Encryption Group Encryption
Spider Oak Public Public URL N/A N/A N/A N/A
URL with Passwd
Tresorit N/A Encrypted N/A RSA N/A ICE
Link or Protocol
TGDH
Difficulty Trivial Trivial Trivial Non-Trivial Trivial Non-Trivial
Table 3.1: Trivial vs. Non-Trivial Sharing Scenarios
each data sharing scenario provided. It also presents an overview of each sharing
scenario according to the level of effort required to ’exploit’ the scenario (Trivial or
Non-Trivial). Our research focuses on the sharing scenarios that the CSPs highlight
as offering 100% data confidentiality (i.e., Private Group and Private Folder sharing).
“N/A” represents a feature that is not implemented or has no documentation to
support the scenario.
As noted above for all CSPs, when data is shared via Private web link, the CSP
requires the transmission of some sensitive data in order to process the user’s request.
Similarly, each of the Public Sharing Scenarios (i.e., Web Link, Group, Folder) re-
quire implicit trust of the CSP in order to make the data public. As a result, these
scenarios were discussed in this section for completeness but fall outside the scope of
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our research due to this requirement of trust.
3.3 Threat Model
In this section we provide a threat model which describes how an attack against
a Cloud Storage Provider (CSP), offering client-side encryption, could potentially be
executed. Rating the threats we identify in this section are outside the scope of our
research. We make the following assumptions with regards to the threat model:
1. The CSP client is trusted and has not been previously modified by a malicious
insider or outsider. In the case of a modified client, users could easily be redi-
rected to a rogue server upon client startup and be forced to perform all sharing
transactions through this server.
2. The CSP server is trusted and has not been compromised. Similar to the case of
a rogue client, a rogue server would allow an adversary access to user certificates
and gain access to decryption keys.
3. Other CSP members can be trusted. When searching for an individual user in
the CSP database, it is assumed that the users identified are legitimately who
they appear to be.
4. The User certificates issued cannot be trusted because they are issued by the
CSP.
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5. Public or Private Web Link Sharing scenarios (as mentioned above) require users
to reveal some form of sensitive information to the CSPs to enable decryption
in a browser environment. Similarly, Public Groups and Folders are accessible
by all members and pose no threats to users.
Our analysis consists primarily of network traffic analysis and reverse-engineering the
source code of each CSP client through decompilation or disassembly. We selected
this course of analysis due to fact that most of the CSP client code used some form of
code obfuscation — making the replication of a rogue client challenging. Additionally,
we could not produce counterfeit certificates ‘on behalf of’ other users, because we
do not possess the signing key of the CSPs we analyzed. This signing key would be
required to produce certificates that CSP client applications would trust. We discuss
below a scenario that would enable a Cloud Provider to maliciously access a user’s
data.
1. User A signs up for Cloud Account
2. User A initiates sharing request with User B
3. Cloud client returns User B’s contact information to User A
4. Cloud Provider substitutes its Public Key for User B
5. Without User A’s knowledge his/her data is encrypted with the Public Key of
the Cloud Provider
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6. Cloud Provider is able to decrypt User A’s data and view its contents
7. Cloud Provider then re-encrypts data with User B’s Public Key and Cloud
Client sends sharing request to User B
8. User B decrypts the data sent by User A w/o knowledge of the above-stated
attack.
This scenario simply shows that because the CSPs are operating as Certificate
Authorities, certificate manipulation, spoofing, or substitution of any kind can be
accomplished. It is also important to emphasize that a malicious CSP cannot be
detected since it can perform a standard man-in-the-middle attack in which the en-
crypted information flow from the sender is first decrypted and then re-encrypted on
the fly under the recipient’s public key (and vice-versa). In essence, the CSP is able
to spoof the identity of any user through the use of certificates. In the next section,
we show evidence to support our claim that each evaluated CSP is serving in a CA
capacity - making all users susceptible to the aforementioned attacks.
3.4 Analysis Methodology and Results
In this section we provide a detailed review of our analysis results. It is important
to note that although our results do show that each Cloud Storage Provider is in
some capacity operating as a Certificate Authority (i.e., could issue fake certificates
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to its users) - we did not find any evidence to support any claims of misuse by the
Providers themselves (i.e., they are not actively exploiting users via this attack). Our
analysis examined the sharing functions employed by each CSP which consisted of
three phases: 1) Network Traffic Analysis (using Wireshark46 and Fiddler Web Proxy
Debugger47), 2) Source Code Decompilation (using AndroChef Java decompiler48 and
Boomerang C++ decompiler), and 3) Source Code Disassembly (using HopperApp49
and Synalyze50). Evidence of CA functionality validates our assertion that when data
is shared, it is possible for the CSP to view user data which contradicts their 100%
data confidentially claims. Evidence of CA functionality includes (but is not limited
to the following): Certificates (i.e., Root or Intermediary), Certificate Issuance, Cer-
tificate Validation, Certificate Revocation, Certificate Authentication, Certificate Re-
newal, Certificate Registration, Obtaining Certificates, Encryption/Decryption, and
Digital Signature (signing or verification). The processes for performing the network
traffic, source code decompilation, and source code disassembly analyses are discussed
below.
A CA is a Trusted Third Party (TTP) organization or company that issues dig-
ital certificates used to create digital signatures and public-private key pairs. The
role of the CA in this process is to guarantee that the individual granted the unique
certificate is, in fact, who he or she claims to be. CAs are a critical component in
data security and electronic commerce because they guarantee that the two parties
exchanging information are really who they claim to be.51 Serving as a CA, the
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CSPs would potentially be able to issue counterfeit certificates to users – pretending
to be a legitimate entity that data is shared with. The code we identified falls into
five categories: 1) Code Libraries, Certificate Files, Certificate Operations, Keystore
Files/Definitions, and Peripheral Cryptographic Functions. Lastly, we focused on
disassembling code that could not be reproduced in its original form through De-
compilation. The code samples we extracted were only those that could potentially
represent CA functionality. We primarily analyzed the main binary files ( .app, .exe
files) associated with each CSP.
3.4.1 Wuala Analysis
We started our analysis of Wuala by examining the network traffic that was gen-
erated between the client and server during sharing transactions and extracting any
evidence of CA functionality. Through our analysis, we discovered evidence of a
Wuala CA certificate which was used to confirm the validity of the other certificates
below it in the certificate chain. A root certificate is either an unsigned public key
certificate or a self-signed certificate that identifies the Root Certificate Authority
(CA). It is the top-most certificate of the tree, the private key of which is used to
”sign” other certificates. All certificates immediately below the root certificate inherit
the trustworthiness of the root certificate.52
Secondly, during disassembly of the Wuala binaries, we identified multiple refer-
ences to a ’WualaCACerts’ file which contains several certificates that the Wuala
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client uses during its execution to include the Wuala CA file — mentioned previ-
ously. The reference below is to the bouncy castle (Java Crypto Library) implemen-
tation of a Keystore which also contains individual certificate entries. The contents
of this particular file is discussed in the decompilation section below. Lastly, dur-
ing the decompilation phase, we discovered that Wuala uses a combination of Name
Obfuscation (e.g., changing method and variable names while maintaining the func-
tionality). To overcome this, we performed searches across the entire codebase for
files that fit into the aforementioned categories. The primary results of the Wuala
decompilation process yielded the WualaCACerts file. This file contains 4 certificate
entries: wualaadminca, wualaserverca, wualaca, and wualaclientca. Each certificate is
named to denote the function it serves within the operation of the Wuala application
(i.e., administrative, client, server, and CA). Each certificate entry has an ’Extension’
section with an ObjectID and a specification of what the key (within the certificate
file is used for). In each of these, the key is used for Certificate Signing. According to
IBM’s Key usage extensions and extended key Usage page, the Certificate Signing key
usage extension is to be used when the subject public key is used to verify a signature
on certificates. This extension can be used only in CA certificates.53 We summarize
the contents of the Wuala CA certificate below:
Alias name: wualaca, Creation date: Jan 6, 2012
Entry type: trustedCertEntry, Owner: CN=Wuala CA, OU=Wuala,
EMAILADDRESS=cert@wuala.com, Issuer: CN=Wuala CA, OU=Wuala, O=LaCie
EMAILADDRESS=cert@wuala.com, Signature algorithm name: SHA1withRSA
As indicated by the algorithms identified in the certificates as well as the key usage
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extension, this certificate is used for creating and verifying digital signatures. How-
ever, the same certificates could be issued by Wuala for performing other PKI-related
functions to include both encryption and decryption of user data or the creation of
private groups.
3.4.2 Spider Oak Analysis
In the case of Spider Oak, the disassembly of its binary did not yield results to
substantiate our claims, thus we focused primarily on the results of decompilation
and network traffic analysis in this section. During the code analysis of Spider Oak,
we uncovered a ’Public Key’ folder containing DSA files, RSA files, a public key file,
and other crypto-related files. These files were each disassembled and evaluated for
evidentiary purposes. The ‘RSA.pyc’ file is presented below as a representative sam-
ple. It shows a call to (or definition of) a ‘generate’ function used to generate an
RSA public/private key pair programmatically. There is a similar file for generating
a DSA key pair which we excluded. The generation of certificates in a programmatic
function confirms that users are not allowed to use their own certificates for crypto-
graphic purposes which can allow Spider Oak to generate certificates ’on behalf’ of
legitimate users. As a result, a user could be tricked into sharing data with Spider
Oak instead of the intended user.
db "generate(bits:int, randfunc :callable, progress_func:callable)
Generate an RSA key of length ’bits’, using ’randfunc’ to get
random data and ’progress_func’, if present, to display the
progress of the key generation. l\x02"
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Unlike Wuala, Spider Oak does not appear to use any form of code obfuscation. The
files we examined contained the .pyc extension which is the equivalent of a Java Byte
Code file for the Python programming language. To analyze these files, we had to
decompile them to the original Python Source code. Similar to Wuala, Spider Oak
uses a file called ‘certs.pyc’ to store its certificates. This file contained 5 certificate
entries: Equifax Secure CA, GeoTrust Global CA (2), RapidSSL CA, and the Spider
Oak Root CA. Contents of the Spider Oak Root CA certificate are as follows:
Data: Version: 1 (0x0), Serial Number: ea:14:d7:ad:6a:cf:dc:35
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: emailAddress=ssl@spideroak.com, organizationName=SpiderOak
This analysis phase revealed a self-signed root certificate from Spider Oak. A
self-signed certificate is an identity certificate that is signed by the same identity it
certifies. As mentioned above, a typical PKI scheme requires certificates to be signed
by a Trusted Third Party (TTP) for verification purposes. Self-signed certificates
cannot (by nature) be revoked, which may allow an attacker who has already gained
access to monitor and inject data into a connection to spoof an identity if a private
key has been compromised.54 In this case, the attacker could potentially be Spider
Oak (e.g., spoofing the identity of another user and gaining access to user data).
Lastly, examining the network traffic between the Spider Oak client and server
produced the same root certificate identified during Decompilation. As a root certifier,
Spider Oak is also responsible for validating any certificate in its trusted certificate
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chain – to include Spider Oak client certificates issued to users. Finding this type
of certificate also demonstrates the fact that as a certificate issuer, Spider Oak can
issue user certificates that spoof the identity of another user resulting in a data
confidentiality breach when data is shared with another Spider Oak user. Similar
to the Wuala example (discussed above), the Spider Oak Client certificate is also
validated by its respective Spider Oak Root CA.
In a recent article, Eric Snowden urges consumers to adopt more secure file storage
systems which are less susceptible to government surveillance - mentioning Spider Oak
specicially.55 However, he fails to disclose (or realize) the fact that data confidentiality
could be breached if data is shared (as shown above) within these same environments.
Additionally, Spider Oak was interviewed by Senior Writer Brian Butler of Network
World concerning some of our findings.56 The company claims that the features we
evaluated fall outside of the scope of features that they have implemented,57 however,
we assert that in order to share encrypted data - some form of Public Key Encryption
must be used. As a result, Spider Oak users are still subject to this type of flaw.
3.4.3 Tresorit Analysis
During the Decompilation of Tresorit, we did not identify any independent cer-
tificate files as was the case with Wuala and Spider Oak. According to Tresorit’s
documentation, a roaming profile file contains both the SSL/TLS client certificate
and the associated private key required to communicate with Tresorit’s servers, and
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agreement certificates and private keys to securely access and decrypt the contents
of a Tresor. Hence, there were not any specific certificate entries to examine during
this phase.
Disassembly of the Tresorit binary contained a number of references to certificate
operations, files, and uses with application. The entry below shows the loading of a
certificate in the traditional X.509 format. This confirms that X.509 certifications are
utilized in the Tresorit client application for cryptographic functions, however, does
not fully substantiate the fact that Tresorit is operating in a Certificate Authority
(CA) capacity.
db "y_OBJ", 0, db "X509_get_pubkey_parameters", 0
db "X509_load_cert_crl_file", 0, db "X509_load_cert_file", 0
db "X509_load_crl_file", 0
In the network analysis of Tresorit, we identified a certificate issued by Tresorit —
the Tresorit User CA certificate. This certificate differs from the Wuala and Spider
Oak certificates in that it is validated by the StartCom CA which would imply that
they are using a TTP to ensure 100% data confidentiality during sharing transactions.
However, the fact that this certificate was issued by Tresorit verifies that they also
can view user data whenever the keys are used for encryption/decryption purposes.
Additionally, the fact that users are neither allowed to use their own certificates or
enter credentials to generate their own certificates upon signing up with any of the
three CSPs gives credence to our claims that counterfeit certificates could be issued.
This would lead users to implicitly trust that other users are who they say they are
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(i.e., the CSP is not acting on their behalf). In the case of Tresorit, StartCom CA
is serving as the Root CA with Tresorit serving as an Intermediate CA. This differs
from both Wuala and Tresorit, however, is still indicative of Tresorit operating as a
CA in some capacity.
In this chapter we examined three major Cloud Storage Providers (CSPs) for
weaknesses associated with their sharing functions. Each CSP claims to offer 100%
user data confidentiality through all data transactions executed within their respective
cloud instances. We discovered that these principles of confidentiality hold true in
use cases where data is not shared with other cloud users or with entities outside of
the cloud storage environment (e.g., non-members). We presented several scenarios
in which data confidentiality could be breached to include: when data is shared via
Public Web Link, when data is shared via Private Web Link, when CSP is accessed via
Web Browser (i.e., web access), and when data is shared via Group or Private folder
(due to the CSP being the issuer of the certificates used for cryptographic operations
– hence could allocate counterfeit certificates to users). We provide evidence in the
form of Network Traffic and Source Code analysis for each CSP to substantiate these
claims. In the next chapter we provide a stronger version of the Pretty Good Privacy
(PGP) certificate that can be used by users in a cloud environment to address some
of the secure sharing challenges we highlight in this chapter.
43
Chapter 4
Enhancing PGP using Bitcoin and
the Blockchain
In a recent article, Yahoo announced its intentions to add an extension that will
provide its customers with the ability to digitally sign and encrypt messages using
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP). Yahoo plans to use a fork of Google’s End to End
OpenPGP plugin that is currently in development. Yahoo follows the likes of Google,
Facebook and Microsoft, who also recently announced they would encrypt internal
traffic in response to the Snowden spying revelations.58 Traditional methods of se-
curely sharing between two or more parties rely on the use of Public-Key Encryption
within a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). In a traditional PKI scheme, a certificate
authority or certification authority (CA) is an entity that issues digital certificates.
The digital certificate certifies the ownership of a public key by the named subject
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of the certificate. This allows others (relying parties) to rely upon signatures or as-
sertions made by the private key that corresponds to the public key that is certified.
In this model of trust relationships, a CA is a Trusted Third Party (TTP) that is
trusted by both the subject (owner) of the certificate and the party relying upon
the certificate. CAs are characteristic of many PKI schemes.59 Currently, the most
viable alternative for Public Key Crytography based on a CA is PGP. PGP is built
upon a Distributed Web of Trust in which a user’s trustworthiness is established by
others who can vouch for that user’s identity. Preventing its wholesale adoption are
a number of inherent weaknesses to include (but not limited to) the following:
• Trust Relationships are built on a subjective honor system
• Only first degree relationships can be fully trusted
• Levels of trust are difficult to quantify with actual values
• Issues specific to the Web of Trust:
1. Certification. It is currently difficult to get certified if the key is new. In
general people complain that it is hard to find endorsers to enhance the
trustworthiness of a new key - which will limit its use.
2. Endorsement. Competence and willingness of endorsers. There is cur-
rently no incentive to endorse a key of someone you know - much less
someone you indirectly know through a friend or relative.
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Bitcoin is a form of digital currency, created and held electronically.60 Accord-
ing to “Crypto Coin News”, the number of active Bitcoin users worldwide will reach
4.7 million by the end of 2019, marking a significant gain over the 1.3 million last
year, according to a report from Juniper Research.61 As a result of its popular-
ity, we introduce a new Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate format, certificate validation
methodology, and certificate endorsement model that overcomes the issues we have
highlighted above. Issues 1 and 2 with the Web of Trust can be easily solved using
our new Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate format and verification system. Issue 4 can
be resolved by use of an endorsement fee. The amount of the fee can be determined
by the user and will vary based on the current value of a Bitcoin - which has been
relatively stable of late.62 In Issue 2, the bitcoin payment ensures that the endorser
follows the “authentication” procedure otherwise they risk losing bitcoins - which
demonstrates both their competence and willingness to serve as a viable certificate
endorser.
There are some interesting properties of our trust establishment protocol that
could result in safer use of PGP. Property 1) People have the option of using previous
transactions before using a certificate OR directly establishing a trust relationship
themselves with a certificate owner (i.e., direct trust). Property 2) As mentioned
above, because of the risk of losing bitcoins via the identity-verification process, people
will be less likely to leverage our certificates without a direct trust establishment.
Property 3) The block chain and associated identity-verification transactions provide
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transparency into the trustworthiness of others. In addition to these benefits, we
also provide the design of a novel PGP Key Server based on the blockchain’s ability
to store pieces of data since the 0.9.0 release. The 0.9.0 release of Bitcoin Core
added a new standard transaction type granting access to a previously disallowed
script function, OP-RETURN .63 This function accepts a user-defined sequence of up
to 40 bytes (now 80 bytes in current release). Once realized, this new key server
will be completely de-centralized and serve as an appropriate repository for Bitcoin-
Based PGP Certificates. Our work in this chapter specifically provides the following
contributions:
• Bitcoin-Based PGP Certificate: Contains Bitcoin address for identity
verification and certificate revocation.
• Identity-Verification and Revocation Transactions: Serves as alterna-
tive means of verifying a certificate owner’s Public Key contained in a Bitcoin-
Based PGP Certificate. Also provides a mechanism for certificate revocation
using the embedded Bitcoin address for revocation purposes.
• PGP Trust Levels: Allows users to specify the amount of Bitcoins they are
willing to “risk” in order to verify a particular Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate.
This amount (determined by the verifier) now attests to a level of trust the
verifier has in the certificate owner.
• Certificate Signing Endorsements: Adds small incentive fee (via Bitcoin)
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each time an endorser (with a valid Bitcoin address) signs an Enhanced PGP
Certificate stored on Bitcoin-Based PGP Key Server.
• Bitcoin-Based PGP Key Server Design: Demonstrates method of using
the Bitcoin Transaction Blockchain for PGP Key Storage. It offers a com-
pletely decentralized client-based software application that allows users to effi-
ciently store and retrieve Bitcoin-Based PGP certificates within the blockchain.
The application will separate certificate into individual pieces to fit within the
allowed number of bytes and store within blockchain - as append only data.
Similarly, upon request (e.g., based on PGP Key ID or similar), the client will
facilitate the retrieval of PGP certificate fragments and reassemble them for use
by the requesting user.
4.1 Related Work
This section examines previous work that proposes novel methods to protect the
confidentiality of data in an uncontrolled network-accessible environment without the
aid of a Certificate Authority (CA). According to,64 BitPay has launched a project
that leverages bitcoin technology to facilitate a decentralized authentication system.
Called BitAuth, the system uses cryptographic signatures in place of server-side pass-
word storage. BitAuth is a way to do secure, passwordless authentication using the
same elliptic-curve cryptography as Bitcoin. Instead of using a shared secret, the
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client signs each request using a private key and the server checks to make sure the
signature is valid and matches the public key. A nonce is used to prevent replay at-
tacks and provide sequence enforcement.65 Similar to our novel Bitcoin-Based PGP
certificate, BitAuth provides “portable” identity in that the same identity can be used
with (or on) multiple services. BitAuth is a promising new method of authentication,
but currenly relies heavily on the System Identification Number (SIN). The SIN is
a new concept that is similar to a Bitcoin address, however, is not widely adopted.
Whereas, our scheme relies on popular Bitcoin primitives - address, transactions, and
the block chain - that are widely being used. Additionally, since the focus of BitAuth
is on authentication, it cannot be used to protect the confidentiality of information
shared between two parties - as is the primary benefit of our Bitcoin-Based PGP
Certificate.
Off-the-Record (OTR) Messaging is a protocol designed for private social com-
munications. According to,66,67 the notion of an off-the-record conversation captures
the semantics one intuitively wants from private communication - only the two par-
ties involved are privy to the contents of the conversation; after the conversation is
over, no one (not even the parties involved) can produce a transcript; and although
the participants are assured of each other’s identities, neither they nor anyone else
can prove this information to a third party. Current versions of the OTR protocol,
support mutual authentication of users using a shared secret through the socialist
minimalist protocol. This feature makes it possible for users to verify the identity of
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the remote party and avoid a man-in-the-middle attack without the inconvenience of
manually comparing public key fingerprints through an outside channel. OTR’s pri-
mary weakness lies in the fact that it is primarily applicable in the domain of instant
messaging - whereas our Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate can be used in virtually any
domain in which secure information sharing is desired. According to the authors of
the OTR protocol, “The high latency of email communication makes using our“off-
the-record” protocol impractical in the setting of email.”
In,68 a secure replacement for CAs is proposed. Rather than employing a tra-
ditionally hard-coded list of immutable CAs, Convergence allows one to configure a
dynamic set of Notaries which use network perspective to validate user communica-
tions. It provides the following guarantees: Trust Agility, Robustness, Backwards
Compatibility, Extensibility and Anonymity. This all occurs within a distributed
environment in which anyone can serve as a trust notary. Convergence originated
from the ideas originally developed by the Perspectives Project at Carnegie Mellon
University.69 Convergence has great promise in the domain of web browser security
and other areas where SSL is prominent. However, it suffers from the fact that the
number of notaries currently in existence for performing CA functions is limited (due
to it being a fairly new effort). As a result, this could lead to potential Denial of Ser-
vice (DoS) attacks in the event the notaries become overwhelmed with requests. The
Bitcoin infrastructure - upon which our certificate primarily relies - has successfully
processed nearly 40 million transactions (to date).70 This makes it robust against
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volume-based security attacks such as DoS and DDoS - when applicable.
4.2 Public-Key Digital Certificates
In this section we discuss the differences between the traditional PGP Certificate
and our novel Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate which leverages aspects of the Bitcoin
infrastructure to address the shortcomings of the existing PGP certificate web of trust
model.
4.2.1 PGP Certificates
PGP is a public key cryptographic package, which is intended for public usage.
It provides sender authenticity, message integrity and non-repudiation of the sender.
Although PGP can encrypt any data or files, it is most commonly used for e-mail
which has no built-in security as originally implemented. It was originally designed
and developed by Phil Zimmermann in 1991. A PGP certificate includes (but not
limited to) the following information:72
• PGP Version Number: This identifies which version of PGP was used to
create the key associated with the certificate.
• Certificate holder’s public key: This is the public portion of the key pair,
together with the algorithm of the key: RSA, Elgamal or DSA.
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• Certificate holder’s information: This is information about the user, such
as his or her name, user ID, e-mail address, ICQ number, photograph, or other
identifier.
• Digital signature of the certificate owner: This item, also called a self-
signature, is the signature generated using the corresponding private key of the
public key associated with the certificate.
• Validity Period: The certificate’s start date/time and expiration date/time;
indicates when the certificate will expire. If the key pair contains subkeys, then
this includes the expiration of each of the encryption subkeys as well. Subkeys
enable convenient use of separate keys for signing and encryption.
• Preferred symmetric encryption algorithm for the key: This indicates
the encryption algorithm to which the certificate owner prefers to have infor-
mation encrypted by.
A PGP certificate identifies the owner of the public key and contains a signature
of the key’s owner, which states that the key and the identification go together.
Each label contains a different means of identifying the key’s owner (e.g., the owner’s
name and corporate e-mail account, the owner’s nickname and home e-mail account,
a photograph of the owner - all in one certificate). A single certificate can contain
multiple signatures. Several or many people may sign the key/identification pair to
attest to their own assurance that the public key definitely belongs to the specified
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owner. The list of signatures of each label may differ. Signatures attest to the
authenticity that one of the labels belongs to the public key, not that all the labels
on the key are authentic.73 Unlike, the X.509 certificate, PGP certificates do not rely
on a CA for identity-verification - but on a Web of Trust. As this ‘web’ grows the
reputation (or binding of the certificate to the user identity therein) proportionally
grows. Since PGP allows anyone to be a ‘trusted introducer’ on the web of trust, the
identity-verification could be very subjective and easily exploited (e.g., by someone
who simply signs each certificate he/she receives without verifying the requestor’s
identity). This is very similar to a facebook user who accepts all friend requests
without confirming whether or not they know the individual who sent the request.
Additionally, as mentioned above, because PGP has not been widely adopted and is
difficult to deploy, we seek to leverage Bitcoin to encourage a larger scale adoption
of PGP. In the following subsection, we present our Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate
format that builds on this concept of a web of trust to primarily overcome some of
the weaknesses inherent to the PGP.
4.2.2 Bitcoin-Based PGP Certificates
Bitcoin is an experimental, decentralized digital currency that enables instant
payments to anyone, anywhere in the world. Bitcoin uses peer-to-peer technology
to operate with no central authority: managing transactions and issuing money are
carried out collectively by the network. Bitcoin is designed around the idea of using
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cryptography to control the creation and transfer of money, rather than relying on
central authorities.74,75 Our Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate contains all the relevant
elements found in a traditional PGP Certificate but also includes a Bitcoin Address
for Identity-Verification and one used for Certificate Revocation. A Bitcoin address
is an identifier of 27-34 alphanumeric characters, beginning with the number 1 or 3,
that represents a possible destination for a Bitcoin payment. A Bitcoin transaction is
a signed section of data that is broadcast to the network and collected into blocks. It
typically references previous transaction(s) and dedicates a certain number of bitcoins
from it to one or more new public key(s) (Bitcoin addresses).76 Because transactions
must be verified by miners, Bitcoin users are sometimes forced to wait until they
have finished mining. The bitcoin protocol is set so that each block takes roughly
10 minutes to mine. In the case of a purchase, some merchants may make users
wait until this block has been confirmed, which will delay the receipt of the digital
goods that have been paid for - whereas in other cases (e.g., low value transactions),
a merchant will give access to the goods prior to the transaction being verified by
the miners.77 In our case, the delay does not pose a major problem since it will only
take place when a trust relationship is being established for the first time - not upon
certificate generation. The value of using Bitcoin in the context of a PGP certificate
centers around the fact that because it is built upon a peer-to-peer network, it is able
to perform its functions (e.g., money transfers, double-spending prevention) without
the aid of a CA - similar to the traditional web of trust. This is advantageous in any
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context where end-to-end data confidentiality is needed or desired (e.g., email, text
message, cloud sharing, or social network communications). Users are more likely to
trust an infrastructure that is independent of any CAs, but can still offer the same
cryptographic guarantees (i.e., confidentiality and integrity) as an environment that
is under their full control or purview.
4.3 PGP Threats and Security Goals
In this section, we expound on the threats we identified in the introduction and
describe our security goals. We make the following assumptions as it pertains to these
threats.
1. The PGP users are leveraging the Web of Trust for certificate vetting.
2. The PGP user certificates are also capable of supporting a hierarchical structure
and use of a CA (similar to the traditional X.509 certificate). However, we make
the assumption that a CA is not being used.
3. PGP users can assign a level of trust to another PGP user’s public key
4. PGP users can assign a level of validity to another PGP user’s public key
55
CHAPTER 4. ENHANCING PGP USING BITCOIN AND THE BLOCKCHAIN
4.3.1 Threat Scenarios
Although there are a number of well documented issues with PGP, we primarily
focus on threats relating to certificate validation, endorsement, and trust relationship
establishment. Other threats associated with PGP, such as privacy of the Web of
Trust and the fair exchange of Certificate Endorsers, are outside of the scope of our
research. One of the main issues with the Web of Trust model is that beyond a first
degree trust relationship, it is difficult to quantify trust. As a result, it becomes a
scenario that is relatively easy for an attacker to exploit. This is primarily due to
the fact that within PGP, anyone can serve as a trusted introducer (essentially a CA)
to another individual. This is analogous to a member of a social network accepting
every friend request that he/she receives. There is no way of knowing whether or not
the individual being vouched for is actually who they say they are - which makes this
a very dangerous weakness of the current PGP Web of Trust model.
One can mitigate the threat of compromise through use of our new Bitcoin-Based
PGP certificate and Public Key validation process. Recall that during the identity-
verification process, there is always the risk of losing the Bitcoins that are sent to a
Certificate Owner. However, in the event that the Bitcoins are not returned (e.g., due
to an adversarial threat or greedy Certificate Owner), the more valuable commodity
(the information) will be spared from being exposed. In our new certificate, since we
associate a Bitcoin Value with a trust relationship, it is easy to infer (by examining
previous identity-verification transactions), how much an individual is trusted. By
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using Bitcoin as a form of trust establishment, as the number of transactions increase
to a particular Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate, the level of trust will also increase in
the associated identity.
As mentioned above, the levels of trust with the PGP are difficult to rely on with
any certainty. There are 3 levels of trust that can be assigned to someone’s Public
Key within PGP: Complete Trust(2), Marginal Trust(1), or No Trust (0). Similarly,
there are also 3 levels of validity: Valid, Marginal Validity, or Invalid. PGP requires
at least 1 Completely Trusted signature or 2 Marginally Trusted signatures to es-
tablish a Public Key as Valid.72 Even with its numerical value system that maps to
a particular “level”, PGP users are subject to the loose definitions of validity and
trustworthiness of a PGP key. The highest level of trust in a key, implicit trust,
is trust in a Certificate Owner’s own key pair. PGP assumes that if you own the
private key, you must trust the actions of its related public key.72 However, beyond
one’s own key pair, how can an actual value be assigned to a trust relationship? This
challenge arises when users are asked to make security decisions. In a recent article,
Michigan State University professor Rick Walsh studies the reasoning process behind
the decisions people make that lead to computer security breaches.71 His research
shows that how people visualize and conceptualize hackers and other cybercriminals
affects their cybersecurity decision-making. In the case of this threat, most users will
assume that the mere fact that they are using PGP makes them secure (i.e., their
visualization of the adversary). Hence, their concern of assigning an appropriately
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level of validity or trust to another’s PGP key is unlikely. It is also likely the case that
there is a lack of understanding of what an appropriate designation would be - unless
training were provided or there was a physical trust relationship between verifier and
Certificate Owner.
With our new endorsement process offered via Bitcoin, this threat would be miti-
gated by the following constructs of our scheme: 1) Certificate Signing MUST precede
the incentive fee. A fixed fee of 0.001 BTC is sent to the Bitcoin address provided
by the certificate endorser (fee is paid from the certificate owner’s bitcoin address -
as available). This fee cannot be modified by the certificate owner OR the endorser
- however, it serves as a small incentive (e.g., Thank You for Signing) to willing and
competent endorsers, 2) Endorsement process is not automated. Our prototype forces
users to go through a step by step process in order to sign a certificate stored on our
server, and 3) Levels of Trust are established by the certificate endorser, not cer-
tificate owner. In our scheme, when performing an identity-verification transaction,
any amount of Bitcoins can be sent for verification purposes. These Bitcoins are ‘at
risk’ until the certificate owner returns them. As a result, this serves as a very clear
indication of trust between certificate endorser and owner. For example, one would
risk more Bitcoins in verifying a close friend’s PGP certificate than someone who
was not in his/her close circle of friends. As a last option, subsequent endorsers of a
particular PGP key can glean levels of trust very easily prior to ‘risking’ their own
Bitcoins using an identity-verification transaction - as previously discussed.
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A few additional threats to consider with leveraging Bitcoin as an alternative
method of certificate verification are those related to rogue certificate owners, wealthy
endorsers, and untrustworthy endorsers. In the first case, a certificate owner can
generate a PGP key and use it for collecting payments and never return incoming
identity-verification transactions to endorsers. To further complicate this scenario, a
wealthy endorser risks very little by endorsing such users. To address these threats,
we still rely on the PGP trust model that allows for out-of-band methods of certifi-
cate verification and a web of trust. The inference is that users will not initiate an
identity-verification transaction with someone they do not already know and trust
from prior interactions. Additionally, in the case of the wealthy endorser, only one
verification transaction is considered valid for a particular certificate. Thus, their
credibility (over time) will come into question as they continue to endorse untrust-
worthy certificates. Lastly, we consider the scenario where endorsers are suspected of
being malicious by endorsing ‘just for the sake of endorsing’. Since our endorsement
scheme does not invalidate - but augments - the endorsement process provided by
PGP, over time a malicious endorser would be classified as someone who cannot be
trusted - especially if they are endorsing both questionable and legitimate certificates.
A legitimate case to consider is someone who is a professional certificate endorser.
Someone whose professional responsibility is to endorse new certificates has their job
(and reputation) to consider if they are found to be endorsing certificates that are
not legitimate - over time.
59
CHAPTER 4. ENHANCING PGP USING BITCOIN AND THE BLOCKCHAIN
4.4 Prototype Design
In this section, we describe the implementation details of our prototype. The
prototype will be a hosted web application that will resemble a traditional Public
Key Certificate server. A Certificate or key server receives and serves existing cryp-
tographic keys to users or other computer programs. The keys distributed by the
key server are almost always provided as part of a cryptographically protected iden-
tity certificate containing not only the key but also ’entity’ information about the
owner of the key. In the case of our Bitcoin-Based PGP Certificate server, the cer-
tificates will be in the OpenPGP public key format - with the additional Bitcoin
addresses for identity-verification and certificate revocation as specified in section 3.
The primary motivations for creating a new certificate server are to 1) Accommodate
our new Bitcoin-Based PGP certificates, 2) Enable Identity-Verification and Revoca-
tion transactions, and 3) Enable Certificate Signing Endorsements. To faciliate these
“features”, our certificate server provides the following functions: Generate, Revoke,
Verify, and Sign. We discuss each in the following sub-sections after which we detail
the design of our novel PGP Key server based on the blockchain as an area of future
work.
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4.4.1 Generate and Revoke
Our Bitcoin-Based PGP certificates are generated using the openpgp javacript
package - which is a javascript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. This stan-
dard is defined by RFC4880. This package provides functions to encrypt and sign
your data and communication, features a versatile key management system as well as
access modules for all kinds of public key directories. As it is designed for web-based
devices, it can be used as an alternative to GnuPG, also known as GPG, which is a
command line tool with features for easy integration with other applications.79 Each
Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate will contain a set of required parameters prior to gen-
eration and items that will be automatically generated by the prototype application.
One thing to note is that our implementation does not require any modification of
the original PGP certificate format. We leverage the key server to store both the
identity-verification and revocation addresses listed in the PGP comment field.
In PGP, users can revoke their certificate if they feel like the certificate has been
compromised. PGP also allows a user to designate a certificate revoker. With PGP
certificates, the user usually posts the revoked certificate on a certificate server. To
enable an easier revocation process for our Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate, we are able
to take advantage of the Bitcoin transaction block chain for revocation purposes. The
block chain is a transaction database shared by all nodes participating in a system
based on the Bitcoin protocol. A full copy of a currency’s block chain contains every
transaction ever executed in the currency. With this information, one can find out
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how much value belonged to each address at any point in Bitcoin history.80 The
immutable nature of the Bitcoin Transaction Block chain makes it attractive from
a certificate revocation standpoint. To revoke a certificate, we perform a Bitcoin
transaction between the two Bitcoin addresses colocated in the Bitcoin-Based PGP
certificate. This transaction can only be performed by the certificate owner once
authenticated.
Key revocation is arguably the most important component of any certificate-based
identification system. Our implementation deliberately forces the user to make a valid
Bitcoin transaction to a legitimate Bitcoin address in his possession. Alternatively,
the revocation status could be stored in OP-RETURN fields if our decentralized ap-
proach is adopted (as explained later in the paper). Our current method, however,
has an important technical advantage: It makes verification of a certificate status
extremely efficient since revocation transactions will be stored in the Bitcoin Unspent
Transaction Outputs (UXTO) database and propagated among all nodes automat-
ically. The UXTO are redeemable transactions and the information on certificate
status will be kept in main memory for efficient verification.
4.4.2 Verify and Sign
An identity-verification transaction is the primary mechanism by which a user can
verify another user’s Public Key in a Bitcoin-Based PGP certificate. We accomplish
this by associating a Bitcoin Address with each generated PGP certificate. To per-
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form the Bitcoin Identity-Verification transactions, we leverage the ‘jsonRPCClient’
library’s sendtoaddress function. This function sends a specified amount from a
server’s available balance to a specified bitcoin address. It takes the following param-
eters:
• bitcoinaddress - Bitcoin address to send to.
• amount - Amount to send (float, rounded to the nearest 0.01).
• minconf - Minimum number of confirmations req’d for transferred balance.
• comment - Comment for transaction.
• comment-to - Comment for to-address.
The first step in an identity-verifcation transaction is to connect to a local or
remote bitcoin instance. In the case of our web server, users are required to have
an existing Blockchain account (or they can sign up for one via our site). Next, the
getBalance() function is used to determine if there are enough funds in which to
initiate an identity-verification transaction. If so, the first transaction, ‘Tx-1’, which
represents the initial identity-verification transaction, is sent to the Certificate owner’s
Bitcoin Address. Once ‘Tx-1’ is received by the Certificate owner, the Certificate
owner has the option to send the funds back to the verifier in transaction ‘Tx-2’.
Lastly, once ‘Tx-2’ is received by the verifier, the transactions ‘Tx-1’ and ‘Tx-2’ are
compared for equality. If they are equal, the verifier can proceed to confirm the
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validity of the certificate and use it for regular PGP certificate operations. Once
the identity-verification transaction is complete, the verifier will have the option of
signing the Public Key of the Certificate that was just verified. This function mirrors
the traditional signing of a Public Key, but differs in the fact that the signature will
be added to the list of Web of Trust signatures associated with the Public Key signed.
It also results in an endorsement for the signer - which is automatically sent to the
signer’s bitcoin address. The entire certificate endorsement process between a user
Alice and a user Bob is shown in below. As shown, this entire process is conducted via
our Bitcoin-Based PGP Key Server - making it very easy to endorse and verify new
PGP Keys. The server also supports the use of PGP keys for normal operations such
as encryption and decryption of standard ASCII text. After each identity-verification
transaction and certificate signing (endorsement) operation, we provide a link to the
transaction hash for external verification purposes (i.e., via the blockchain itself).
4.4.3 Blockchain PGP Key Server
In this subsection we describe the design of a novel PGP Key Server based on
the Bitcoin Transaction Blockchain. Historically, the use of bitcoins’ blockchain to
store data unrelated to bitcoin payments has been a controversial subject. Many
developers consider such use abusive and want to discourage it. Others view it as
a demonstration of the powerful capabilities of blockchain technology and want to
encourage such experimentation. Those who object to the inclusion of non-payment
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Certificate Endorsement Process 
Alice Server Bob 
Searches for Bob's PGP Key 
Selects Bob's PGP Key 
Click to Verify Bob's Key 
Logs into Blockchain Account 
Sends Verification Fee (Tx-1) 
Logs into Blockchain Account 
Verifies BTC amount sent 
Sends verificate Fee (Tx-2) 
Logs into Blockchain Account 
Compares (Tx-1) and (Tx-2) 
Sign Bob's PGP Key 
Send Endorsement Fee (0.001 BTC) 
alt [(Tx-1) == (Tx-2)] 
Disconnection Request 
[(Tx-1) != (Tx-2)] 
Figure 4.1: Certificate Endorsement
data argue that it causes “blockchain bloat”, burdening those running full bitcoin
nodes with carrying the cost of disk storage for data that the blockchain was not
intended to carry. Moreover, such transactions create UTXO that cannot be spent,
using the destination bitcoin address as a free-form 20-byte field. Because the address
is used for data, it does not correspond to a private key and the resulting UTXO can
never be spent.81 As a result, these transactions continue to increase the size of the
blockchain over time.
In version 0.9 of the Bitcoin Core client, a compromise was reached with the
introduction of the OP-RETURN operator. OP-RETURN allows developers to add
40 bytes (now 80 bytes) of nonpayment data to a transaction output. However,
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unlike the use of ”fake” UTXO, the OP-RETURN operator creates an unspendable
output, which does not need to be stored in the UTXO set. OP-RETURN outputs are
recorded on the blockchain, so they consume disk space and contribute to the increase
in the blockchains’ size, but they are not stored in the UTXO set and therefore do
not bloat the UTXO memory pool and burden full nodes with the cost of more
expensive RAM..81 As a result, innovative decentralized applications such as the one
subsequently described can be realized. We focus our design discussions on storage
and retrieval methods we would employ in an actualization of a prototype application
and summarize with an overall component diagram.
STORAGE: Depending on the size of PGP key generated, the size could range
from 1018 bytes (1024-Bit key) to 3100 bytes (4096-Bit key). PGP supports up
to an 8192-Bit key which corresponds to an even larger on-disk or memory capacity
for storage purposes. Keeping this in mind, along with the fact that the blockchain
only accepts ‘data’ transactions of up to 80 bytes in size, our storage leverages an
innovative certificate fragmentation mechanism to enable both logical storage and
efficient retrieval. A message within our PGP Key Server will consist of a 5 Byte
Header which will include the PGP Key ID (KeyID), Fragment ID (FID), Total
Fragments (Total), and the Message Data. Message format is shown below:
Upon initiating a storage request, a user will provide the KeyID and PGP Key
(Message Data) to the client application. The Bitcoin Address associated with the
PGP Key will also be extracted and provided as input - as it will be required during
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80 Bytes 
4 Bytes 75 Bytes 4 Bits 4 Bits 
Figure 4.2: Blockchain PGP Message
the information retrieval process. The processing of each PGP Key will take place as
follows:
In short, this algorithm computes Bitcoin transactions for the PGP Key 75 bytes at
a time since this is the allowed size of our PGP Key Server messages (given the header
of 5 bytes). A few things to note: Total Fragments denote the number of fragments
there will be given the size of the PGP Certificate. In the simplest example, a PGP
key of size 75 bytes will result in a Total Fragment computation of 1. The round
function (or similar) will have to be used to ensure that the Total Fragment count is
a whole number. The Pointer variable is used to both split and process each PGP
Key segment from the beginning of the PGP Key to its end. Prior to discussing the
retrieval method we employ, there are a number of similar libraries in existence that
are used for similar purposes (i.e., to store data in the Bitcoin transaction blockchain.
It is helpful to describe a few of the key ones here: 1) Coinspark allows you to
Add messages to bitcoin transactions and Transfer any asset over the Internet, 2)
Coinsecrets enables OP-RETURN transactions to be retrieved from the bitcoin or
testnet blockchains, as well as unconfirmed transactions from the memory pool. Their
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Input: PGP-Key, PGP-Key-Length, PGP-Key-ID, Bitcoin Address
Result: TRUE or FALSE
ChunkSize=75; Pointer=0;




while (Pointer LESS THAN PGP-Key-Length) do
DATA = readKey (PGP-Key, Pointer, ChunkSize);
if more DATA then
Header = [PGP-Key-ID + Index + Total Fragments];
Send-Message (Header, DATA, Bitcoin Address, Fee);
Index = Index + 1;
Pointer = Pointer + Chunksize;







Algorithm 1: Process PGP Key
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API also parses the content of the OP-RETURNs for display in decoded form, and 3)
Factom is leveraged by Businesses and governments to simplify records management,
record business processes, and address security and compliance issues.82–84
RETRIEVAL: The Retrieval of a PGP Key from the blockchain requires sev-
eral steps that mirrors (in reverse) the storage operations performed. Similar to the
defragmentation process of an IP datagram. The steps are as follows:
1. User requests Bitcoin-Address, KeyID from Client application (Bitcoin-Address
is used to identify OP-RETURN transactions associated with KeyID.
2. Application Searches Blockchain for OP-RETURN transactions associated with
Bitcoin-Address (using the chain.com API) and stores transactions in Results
Array.
3. Application Extracts KeyID from Element[0] of Results array element
4. Application Verifies that KeyID matches KeyID from Step 1
5. Application Extracts Total Fragments from Element[0] of Results array element
6. Application Verifies number of transactions (Results Array Length) retrieved
equals Total Fragments in PGP Key Message
7. If ALL transactions were retrieved successfully, Application reorders Messages
and stores Messages in Ordered-Results Array
8. Reassemble PGP Key from Ordered-Results Array
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9. Utilize PGP Key for Normal Operations (Sign, Verify, Encrypt, Decrypt)
Chain’s enterprise-grade block chain API makes it easy to build Bitcoin applica-
tions that are fast, reliable, and secure.85 The Get Bitcoin Address OP-RETURN
function returns any OP-RETURN values sent and received by a Bitcoin Address
in an Array of OP-RETURN OBJECTS. The OP-RETURN OBJECT is a pseudo-
object that is extracted from the Transaction Object. It is an interpretation of the
OP-RETURN script within a zero-value output in a Bitcoin transaction. The OP-
RETURN can be used to include 80 bytes of metadata in a Bitcoin transaction.
Each OP-RETURN OBJECT Contains the following data that we leverage for step
2 above. Lastly, it is important to note that the OP-RETURN data will have to
be decoded prior to being used. This decoding process is elegantly handled by the
chain API. This decoded text is the content of our message that we specify in step
2 above. We conclude this section with a overview diagram (Figure 2) of how each
PGP message fragment looks within the overall structure of the Bitcoin Transaction
Blockchain. It is highly probable that each message could be contained in a disparate
block within the transaction blockchain. Thus the header is vital in ensuring the
retrieval process works seamlessly. In Figure 2, we demonstrate a sample message
broken into six message fragments and stored in three separate transaction blocks.
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Figure 4.3: PGP Message Stored in Transaction Blockchain
4.5 Prototype Demonstration Output
In this section, we walk through the steps of using our prototype application to
perform the bitcoin identity-verifications functions and the output produced by our
application at each stage (as applicable).










2. Alice sends Certificate to Bob (no output - performed out of band)
3. Bob sends Identity-Verification transaction to embedded Bitcoin Address
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Current Balance is: 0.033673




4. Alice sends Identity-Verification funds back to Bob’s Bitcoin address
Current Balance is: 0.01198579
How much would you like to send for
RETURN VERIFICATION TRANSACTION?
0.00856179 Sending 0.00856179 to
1HiLRA7pC3d6mLGUpuhx3qH4G8sDVbdpD2
5. Bob checks for return of Identity-Verification funds
Amount Sent: 0.00856179
Transaction of 0.00856179 Found!
Result = True
6. Bob checks Alice’s certificate for validity (result true)
7. Alice (at later date) revokes her certificate
Sent Revocation Transaction of Amount:




8. Bob checks Alice’s certificate for validity
Bitcoin Address Verified
Amount Sent: 0.000017
Revoke Transaction of 0.000017 Found!
72
CHAPTER 4. ENHANCING PGP USING BITCOIN AND THE BLOCKCHAIN
In this paper we presented a number of enhancements to PGP and associated
Web of Trust - which has suffered from a littany of issues since its inception. Specific
issues of certification, endorsement, and ambiguous levels of trust have prevented
its wide scale adoption. The contributions we discussed include a novel Bitcoin-
Based PGP Certificate format, Design of a Distributed PGP Key Server - using the
Bitcoin transaction blockchain for certificate storage and retrieval, Certificate Signing
Endorsements, and Identity-verification and revocation transactions using Bitcoin.
We demonstrate how these added features and capabilities can potentially result in a
greater use of PGP which has inherently proven security properties. Our Enhanced
PGP Key Server is currently hosted at [http://enhancedpgp.com/]. The next chapter
seeks to address the threat of data exfiltration in Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) Cloud
Storage environments to build on work we presented in this chapter.
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Mitigating Data Exfiltration in
SaaS Clouds
5.1 Introduction
According to,86 security incident handling, an integral part of security manage-
ment, treats detection and analysis of security incidents as well as the subsequent
response activities (i.e., containment, eradication, and recovery) as outlined below:
• Detection: Discover indicators of possible security incidents
• Analysis: Ascertain that indeed a security incident is at hand and understand
what exactly has happened/is happening
• Containment: Contain the incident before it spreads and overwhelms resources
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or increases damage
• Eradication and Recovery: Eliminate system changes caused by the incident
and recover normal operations
• Preparation and Continuous Improvement: Set up/adapt incident handling ac-
tivities according to changing requirements and system/threat landscape.
Existing processes and methods for incident handling are geared towards infras-
tructures and operational models that will be increasingly outdated by cloud comput-
ing. Research has shown that to adapt incident handling to cloud computing envi-
ronments, cloud customers must establish clarity about their requirements on Cloud
Service Providers (CSPs) for successful handling of incidents and contract CSPs ac-
cordingly. Secondly, CSPs must strive to support these requirements and mirror them
in their Service Level Agreements. Typically, security incidents will cross the bound-
aries of both customer and CSP in each of the common deployment models (i.e., SaaS,
Paas, and IaaS) denoting both joint responsibility and access. This must be taken
into account when setting up incident handling or prevention for a cloud infrastruc-
ture. Our research focuses on attacks confined to the SaaS deployment model due to
the limited level of control a user has over the security of their data once it is stored
within the cloud.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have been widely used to detect malicious
behaviors in network communication and hosts. IDS management is an important
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capability for distributed IDS solutions, which makes it possible to integrate and han-
dle different types of sensors or collect and synthesize alerts generated from multiple
hosts located in the distributed environment. Facing new application scenarios in
Cloud Computing, the IDS approaches yield several problems since the operator of
the IDS should be the user, not the administrator of the Cloud infrastructure. Ex-
tensibility, efficient management, and compatibility to virtualization-based context
need to be introduced into many existing IDS implementations. Additionally, the
Cloud providers need to enable possibilities to deploy and configure IDS for the user.
To date, a number of theoretical frameworks have been proposed to address these
concerns.87–102 None, however, have been implemented in practice, hence, the con-
cepts that are presented cannot be effectively validated. Other research focuses on
protecting the Virtual Machine (VM) within the cloud infrastructure from attacks
- primarily focused on monitoring VM resources to maximize utilization or prevent
Denial of Service attacks.103–112
One major gap identified in our assessment of the current state of affairs in ap-
plying IDS concepts in a Public cloud setting is data exfiltration detection and pre-
vention. Data exfiltration is defined as the unauthorized transfer of data from a
computer. To address this particular gap, we propose a novel method for detect-
ing and preventing data exfiltration using cyber deception.113 Cyber deception is
a deliberate act to conceal activity on a network, create uncertainty and confusion
against an adversary’s efforts to establish situational awareness and to influence and
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misdirect adversary perceptions and decision processes. To accomplish this, we fo-
cus on the Detection and Containment aspects of the incident handling process. In
the case of our research, containment refers to the efforts aimed at preventing the
exfiltration from occurring - not preventing the spread of a cyber infection. Our ap-
proach is implemented such that cloud users do not have to rely on the protection
mechanisms offered by the Cloud Storage Provider (CSP) which are often limited
to common Data Loss Prevention techniques - which operate based on pre-defined
policies. The limitations of these approaches include: 1) can be bypassed by the use
of encryption 2) are also under the control of the CSP (client-side or server-side) and
3) are not designed to prevent against unknown attacks (i.e., that are not specified in
the deployed policy). To address these and other limitations we propose the Honey
Cloud Project under which will we will address a number of these issues through
Decoy Objects, Data Masking, and a Threat Aware Deception-based Cloud Infras-
tructure. The presented approach is not designed to replace existing solutions, but
provide a mechanism that increases the Defense in Depth of data within a SaaS cloud
environment.
5.2 Background
As mentioned above, existing research largely has focused on the protection on
Virtual Machines within Cloud infrastructures as well as on proposing frameworks
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that would aid in the detection/protection of data within the cloud. None of the
aforementioned methods resulted in implementations that could be used by the public
to protect data in SaaS storage infrastructures. The following research outlines a
variety of methods attempting to remedy this. One common weakness with those
discussed below is that the user is not in control of the protection mechanisms applied
to their data. Hence, they have to trust that 1) the protections offered are adequate,
2) the audit information is accurate, and 3) the protections will not fail in the event
of adversarial compromise.
5.2.1 Threat Model
When user data is stored in a Software as a Service (SaaS) Public Cloud setting,
it is subject to the security features provisioned by the CSP. As mentioned above,
this leads to a number of threats that user’s data can be subject to without their
knowledge or control. We align our efforts on the methods by which sensitive data
can be exfiltrated once it has been transferred to the cloud. Our research does not
examine uploads for policy conformance. Specifically we focus on data that is resident
on the cloud - as we assume that users have followed any relevant policy that governs
the storage of data in the cloud. Within the cloud, there are 3 primary ways data can
be accessed and hence subsequently exfiltrated: 1) Via Sharing (individual or group),
2) Via download (web interface or client application), and 3) Via the cloud interface
(within the cloud environment). Our research addresses the detecting and prevention
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of data exfiltration via sharing and download requests. As previously stated, SaaS
environments are not under the control of the user - hence we cannot modify the
cloud infrastructure to monitor accesses within the environment itself. An additional
feature we provide is the ability to be aware of varying threat conditions - providing
a higher level of protection when the adversarial threat is at its peak.
Within the cloud setting, data exfiltration can be prevented via the following
methods: 1) Detect an attempt and prevent it before it happens - would require the
monitoring of all potential paths of theft in the cloud and intercepting malicious look-
ing attempts, 2) Allow/Disallow information from being uploaded based on individual
or organizational policies, or 3) Allow access to information in cloud only when given
permission or authorization. In the SaaS deployment model, method 1 is not possible
without the modification of the Cloud infrastructure. Method 2 focuses on protecting
information from being exfiltrated via the Cloud - not after the information is stored.
This has also been addressed by CloudFilter (a paper we discuss below). We aim to
control data exfiltration via the 3rd method to prevent attempts by malicious adver-
saries who have compromised a user account.115 We assume that users are generally
trustworthy (i.e., not malicious insiders) and are able to make wise decisions about
who needs to have access to their data - prior to it being uploaded. Our approach can
be used as an alternative or augment to client-side encryption cloud storage vendors
that offer a method of protecting user data from the cloud provider themselves.
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5.2.2 Related Work
5.2.2.1 Cyber Deception:
The art of deception has long since been used as a technique to lure attackers
away from important data and learn about attackers that successfully compromise a
network. In the space of cloud data protection, two methods have been proposed:
Fog Computing and a Honeypot implementation for the cloud. In,116 the authors
propose a novel deception-based concept that focuses on the protection of insider data
theft attacks by monitoring data access in the cloud and detecting abnormal access
patterns. They accomplish this by profiling the normal behavior of users and upon
the detection of an anomaly, they produce and return decoy information (e.g. docs,
honey files, honeypots) to the attacker. Being that there is no implementation in an
actual cloud environment, it is difficult to ascertain the viability of their approach due
to the fact that quantifying normal user behaviors is a difficult problem - in general -
and much more in a cloud computing environment that is largely multi-tenant. Other
approaches117,118 attempt to apply anomaly-based detection mechanisms to the cloud
but suffer from the same - profiling users in such a complex environment and not being
implemented in an actual cloud environment.
Similarly,119 aims to employ deception concepts in a private cloud using a honey-
pot. The authors deploy the Snort Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) in
the Eucalyptus private cloud as a proof of concept implementation. They incorpo-
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rate a honeypot into the NIDS to further entice attackers and provide a mechanism
to learn more about similar future attacks. The primary weaknesses of their approach
is that 1) it would require a major modification to existing cloud infrastructures to
implement their methodologies, 2) it uses a signature-based approach for detection,
and 3) their deployment would require awareness of Cloud infrastructure to enable
full OS coverage (e.g. Windows, Linux, OS X). Neither the Fog Computing, Hon-
eypot, or Anomaly-Based approaches as described would be feasible in practice due
to these limitations. Our proposed solution extends the concepts present within Fog
Computing by providing an implementation in an actual cloud storage environment,
providing a novel mechanism for users to generate decoy information that is derived
from their uploaded files, and focuses specifically on the data exfiltration problem.
Additionally we provide a mechanism that can adjust to current threat conditions as
we subsequently discuss.
Commercial Cloud Providers: There are a number of Commercial Cloud
Providers that provide features to protect the security of cloud user data. The pri-
mary security features they all provide are: the protection of data in transit and data
at rest and two-factor authentication. Other than Box, they all offer limited oversight
of the activities associated with files/folders. Within Dropbox, the event log tracks
when users create, delete, and restore dropbox folders. Once an action is taken, the
event log records the name and ID of the dropbox folder, the action, the user who
made the change, and the date it was performed.120 For Google Drive, the types
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of file activities that are recorded are the: 1) moving and removing, 2) renaming,
3) uploading, 4) sharing and unsharing, and 5) editing and commenting. There are
no specific additional security features provided in the documentation.121 SugarSync
monitors any edits to a file, any new files created, files deleted, and changes to a
folder or sub-folders.122 Box123 offers the most advanced native security features of
all the existing CSPs (to include the ones described above). Box provides comprehen-
sive reporting, logging, and audit trails in order to track account activity, file access,
settings changes and nearly everything else that occurs in Box.
These features allow users to monitor for access violations only, but are not com-
bined with a mechanism to prevent data loss. Box, however, does provide separate
mechanisms to detect and prevent data loss via extended security policies that allows
users to keep content confidential, mitigate data loss, flag risky sharing requests, and
white list certain domains that should be trusted. Some native features are present,
but others are offered via collaborative security partners. CipherCloud (one such
partner) offers of a secure middleware service that provides users with insight into
cloud data.122 They provide a range of features to include: 1) User activity monitor-
ing, 2) Anomaly Detection, 3) Comprehensive Audit Logs, and 4) Ongoing Data Loss
Prevention Monitoring. This solution has a number of promising features, however,
these all require trust of an entity like CipherCloud with their data (risk transfer-
ence) and it also comes at a premium cost and is geared towards organizations - not
individual users.
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CSP IDS Implementations: In,124 Greg Roth and Don Bailey present a
detailed overview of Amazon Web Services (AWS) Intrusion Detection capabilities.
These capabilities are a combination of several features: AWS’s Identity and Access
Management, Multi-Factor Authentication, Amazon S3 Bucket Logging, Security Au-
dit Role, Write Once Storage for Data Provenance (Versioning), and Auditing Logs.
Their approach is to use this compendium of features to detect unauthorized access
to user data based on user roles. The major weakness of this approach is that it is
a script based IDS, not an actual system that the general user can use. Due to the
number of components involved, it would require a security expert to setup, config-
ure, and interpret the resulting alerts. It is limited in scope - focusing primarily on
access permission violations not specific attack types (e.g., data exfiltration, integrity
breaches) and is specific to Amazon EC2, hence, not interoperable with other CSP
infrastructures.
Lastly, in,125 Ioannis and Pietzuch describe CloudFilter - a system for the practical
control of sensitive data propagation to the cloud. Their scheme monitors HTTP File
Transfers to the Cloud independent of the CSP being used. Upon upload of each user
file or files, CloudFilter enforces data propagation policies to confirm that the upload
request is authorized. Their approach is limited to just monitoring the HTTP protocol
which would cause CloudFilter to miss sensitive data being propagating via another
protocol. One major strength of the described approach is that no modification is
necessary to the CSP infrastructure, however, it does require modification of files
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upon upload and web browsers for user identification. This solution does not address
data exfiltration once it is resident within the cloud, because it only monitors uploads.
5.3 Design Goals
As this is research is currently a work in progress, the goal of our prototype will
be to provide a transparent and practical solution for protecting sensitive data stored
in Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) Cloud Storage Providers, which represent stored data
as files. An important requirement is for the system to be easily applicable across
different cloud storage providers with minimal configuration. We will accomplish this
by leveraging a cloud agnostic API to avoid having to adapt to the API of specific
cloud storage service. Secondly, the deceptive information should be automatically
generated based on the input provided to accompany the files that are uploaded.
Lastly, we provide a solution that can be employed in a representative scenario based
on the criticality of the cyber situation and/or INFOCON status. These objectives
can all be accomplish without modification of the cloud infrastructure - which is key
to success in a SaaS cloud environment. Based on our research, there exists no SaaS
Cloud Infrastructure that leverages Cyber Deception as a means of data protection.
Figure 1 provides an illustration of our prototype architecture.
A few foundational concepts in cyber deception have preceded our proposed design
which we outline here for context. Honeyfiles are bait files intended for hackers
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Figure 5.1: Prototype Architecture
to access. The files reside on a file server, and the server sends an alarm when
a honeyfile is accessed.127 In128 Wang et. al. add honey activity to enhance the
realism of honeyfiles. The Decoy Document Distributor (D3) System is a tool for
generating and monitoring decoys. An accompanying website (FOG) allows users to
download files, such as tax documents and receipts, that appear authentic but actually
contain spurious information.129 Lastly, Fox provides a mechanism for placing decoy
documents in places that are more likely to get accessed.130 As previously stated, there
has been much previous work in the area of using deceptive data to defend against
malicious adversaries. Yet no prior work has attempted to adapt these concepts in a
SaaS cloud storage environment - which is out of the control of a user. Secondly, no
work has been proposed that provides the ability to increase or decrease protections
based on varying threat situations. To accomplish these objectives, we propose a
novel cloud storage environment, under the Honey Cloud Project, that uses Cyber
Deception to protect against unauthorized data access requests - leading to potential
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data exfiltration.
Cyber threats commonly change over time within a particular environment. We
argue that this is also the case within a cloud storage environment. Hence, a solution
presented to protect data within that environment, should also be able to adapt to
the ebb and flow of the threat landscape. As the threats increase, the associated
protections to should increase as well. The converse is true for decreasing threat
conditions. We describe the United States threat level system Information Operations
Condition (INFOCON) levels below - which we will adapt for our purposes under the
Honey Cloud Project.
• INFOCON 5 describes a situation where there is no apparent hostile activity
against computer networks. Operational performance of all information systems
is monitored, and password systems are used as a layer of protection.
• INFOCON 4 describes an increased risk of attack. Increased monitoring of all
network activities is mandated, and all Department of Defense (DoD) end users
must make sure their systems are secure. Internet usage may be restricted to
government sites only, and backing up files to removable media is ideal.
• INFOCON 3 describes when a risk has been identified. Security review on
important systems is a priority, and the Computer Network Defense system’s
alertness is increased. All unclassified dial-up connections are disconnected.
• INFOCON 2 describes when an attack has taken place but the Computer Net-
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work Defense system is not at its highest alertness. Non-essential networks may
be taken offline, and alternate methods of communication may be implemented.
• INFOCON 1 describes when attacks are taking place and the Computer Network
Defense system is at maximum alertness. Any compromised systems are isolated
from the rest of the network.
As a means of creating deceptive objects (i.e., decoy documents), we will examine
a variety of data masking techniques. Data masking comes in a number of forms to
include: Data Substitution, Data Shuffling, Number and/or Data Variance, Nulling
or Masking Out of Data, and Data Encryption. Data Substitution allows the masking
to be performed in such a manner that another authentic looking value can be sub-
stituted for the existing value. Data Shuffling is similar to the substitution method
but it derives the substitution set from the same column of data that is being masked
(i.e., in a database). In very simple terms, the data is randomly shuffled within the
column. Number and/or Data variance varies the original value by a specified amount
(e.g., +/- 10 or 20 days). Nulling or Masking Out of data either nulls a value or masks
(e.g., 123-45-7455 translates to XXX-XX-XXXX). Lastly, Data Encryption is often
the most complex approach to solving the data masking problem - since it is an ex-
pensive operation that requires a key. To enable legitimate cloud users’ to distinguish
between decoys and actual files, host system identifiers will be embedded within each
file (e.g. Computer MAC Address, Network IP Address, Network Hostname).
To accommodate changes in the threat environment associated with a particu-
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lar Cloud Storage Provider (CSP), we will provide a mechanism to adjust the data
protection level based on threat intelligence. Table 5.1 provides and overview of the
conditions imposed in a sample Honey Cloud environment. For each INFOCON level,
a more sophisticated level of Data Masking can be employed and the amount of decoy
information exposed can be proportionally adjusted to the current INFOCON level or
criticality of a particular cyber condition. Through this work we will consider these
research questions as a starting point: 1) What data masking techniques are best
suited for creating decoy documents? 2) What data masking techniques should be
employed at each INFOCON level? 3) Should other decoy concepts such as Endless
Files or Honey Encryption be considered in the Honey Cloud? 4) Can Functional
Preserving Encryption be used as a means of Data Masking? 5) What threat intelli-
gence sources should be considered for threat level adjustments? 6) How can threat
intelligence sources be incorporated into Honey Cloud environment without modify-
ing SaaS Cloud infrastructure? 7) What is the storage requirements and overhead for
the Honey Cloud environment? 8) What are the performance impacts of the Honey
Cloud? 9) What information should be logged during access requests? 10) Is the
Honey Cloud better suited for an IaaS or PaaS Cloud Storage Environment?
In this chapter, we have described the aspects of our Honey Cloud Project - which
provides several methods to address the problem of data exfiltration detection and
prevention in a SaaS Cloud Storage environment. Our proposed methods overcome
the limitations of existing approaches that primarily focus on the protection of the
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INFOCON 5 Shuffling 20% Deceptive Objects
INFOCON 4 Number & Date Variance 20% Deceptive Objects
INFOCON 3 Substitution 60% Deceptive Objects
INFOCON 2 Nulling or Masking out 80% Deceptive Objects
INFOCON 1 Encryption (FHE) 100% Deceptive Objects
virtual infrastructure - not the data that is stored in these environments. We will
leverage a number of concepts in cyber deception for data protection and introduce
the ability to adapt to varying threat conditions. Data Loss Prevention (DLP) is often
implemented within a cloud storage environment to protect against data exfiltration.
However, we found that DLP has a number of shortfalls to include: 1) can be bypassed
by the use of encryption 2) are also under the control of the CSP and 3) are not
designed to prevent against unknown attacks. As a result, we show the added value of
using decoy documents within a SaaS environment for more dynamic data protection.





To address the weaknesses discussed in the previous sections, we propose the
following as future areas of research and proof-of-concept implementations. In Se-
cure Cloud Storage environments,A users should be issued standard certificates via a
Trusted Third Party - which is typical in a traditional Public/Private Key implemen-
tation - or should be allowed to use their own certificates (e.g., PGP). Alternatively,
out-of-band verification mechanisms should be used such as those provided by sev-
eral implementations of off-the-record (OTR) messaging.132 For example, the Cloud
Storage Provider (CSP) Tresorit makes use of ICE which is a proprietary protocol
that is designed to work in a semi-trusted environment. It does not rely solely on
the trustworthiness of the certificate authority issuing the users’ certificates, but also
on an invitation secret and optional pairing password. Lastly, to enhance the se-
curity associated with sharing data via Private Web Link, it is possible to require
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password authentication prior to listing shared files. Spider Oak employs such a
strategy, although the CSP would still be required to verify that the password was
entered correctly. In the future, we plan to extend our analysis of Secure CSPs by
examining alternative methods of secure file sharing that do not rely on a CA for
identity-verification - which will consequently overcome a number of weaknesses we
have identified in this research.
In the space of leveraging user-owned certificates such as PGP in a hosted envi-
ronment, our future work will consist of examining alternative methods of employing
Bitcoin for identity-verification using actual Bitcoin Distributed Contracts or alterna-
tive methods that do not require modification of the original PGP certificate format.
Keybase.io allows you to get a public key, safely, starting just with someone’s social
media username(s), but also provides other mechanisms of verifying a particular key
(e.g., pgp fingerprint and bitcoin addresses).133 In other words, it provides a com-
pendium of online identifiers for a particular owner of a public key stored on their
servers. An additional area for exploration would be to enable verifiers to leverage
one or more of the online identifications provided by Keybase.io to strengthen the
trust of certificate stored on our server (via their API). Furthermore, the integra-
tion of Bitcoin-Based PGP Certificates into infrastructures where secure sharing is
offered (via text messaging, chat applications, and Secure Cloud Storage servers)
would demonstrate their usefulness in actual environments. Lastly, a stronger form
of certificate revocation should be explored that builds on the procedure we present
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in our research.
Our primary goal in mitigating data exfiltration in Software-as-a-Service Cloud
Storage environments is to provide a cloud agnostic proof-of-concept implementation.
This implementation will conform to the design specifications outlined in Chapter 5.
Additionally, we plan to integrate actual threat database sources to provide higher
fidelity information prior to making a data protection adjustment (e.g. threatconnect,
threatscape, enigmadatabase). We will identify other actions that could be taken
upon notification of an increased threat level (e.g., increase the ratio of decoy objects
in the environment or impose a data access timeout period). In this thesis, we focused
on the action that was most effective in defending against data exfiltration attempts.
Addressing other stages within the cyber kill chain model would be a natural evolution
of our concepts. The goal would be to address different aspects of the user experience
in the cloud (from a security perspective) with various cyber deception artifacts. In
this work we have implicitly focused on mitigating the ‘action on objectives’ stage
of the kill chain process. Future work would seek to address the Reconnosaince,




In this thesis, we examined current methods of preserving the security and privacy
of client data being processed and/or stored in a cloud computing environment. When
it comes to cloud data protection, the methods employed can be very similar to
protecting data within a traditional data center. Authentication and identity, access
control, encryption, secure deletion, integrity checking, and data masking are all data
protection methods that have applicability in cloud computing. In response to these
findings, we have presented three primary contributions that focus on enhancing
the overall security of user data residing in cloud storage environments. We have
described several research outcomes that can aid in the protection of data stored
within hosted environments such as the cloud. Our primary goal is to inform Cloud
Storage Providers of ways to offer users a more secure storage environment. We also
aim to shed light on the security practices of Cloud Storage vendors to enable users
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